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The word “federalism” conveys many different ideas, a term 
broad enough to encompass the odd phrase “Fourth Amendment 
federalism.”  The United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has suggested a peculiar interest in deferring to 
modern state search and seizure laws when determining what 
constitutes a reasonable police practice.  Under this idea of 
“federalism,” the Court has viewed current state laws as a source to 
define the scope of the Fourth Amendment.  This interweaving of 
state practices with federal protections raises important federalism 
questions, particularly when the context involves criminal law 
enforcement.  State legislators during their campaigns have often 
promised to strongly support law enforcement interests, with little 
interest in promising to repeal criminal laws that infringe current 
contemporary values.  In addition, some state court judges today may 
similarly campaign to preserve law enforcement powers in light of the 
Court’s recent acknowledgment of their new freedom to publicly 
discuss controversial issues.  As a result, the Court’s deference to state 
search and seizure practices may fail to safeguard a politically 
unpopular group—alleged criminals. 
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When police officers search and seize individuals, they may face 
questioning in court about whether their actions violated the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution1 and state law.  When 
deciding whether they crossed the federal constitutional line, the 
United States Supreme Court has considered state search and seizure 
practices at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s enactment and 
current state practices.  Understandably, the Court has cited early 
state practices to characterize what the Framers of the Constitution 
may have intended the scope of the Fourth Amendment to be.  When 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Court has both trusted and 
mistrusted modern state policing policies; sometimes the Court has 
declared them unconstitutional, and at other times, the Court has 
used them oddly as a source in defining the scope of federal 
protection. 
When the Court selectively (and extensively) incorporated the 
Bill of Rights by its construction of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it declared that federal procedural 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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safeguards applied to states’ criminal proceedings.2  The Warren 
Court continued to expand this federal presence by broadly 
construing the Fourth Amendment,3 only to be later checked by the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, who constructed doctrines narrowing 
protections for criminal defendants.4  In addition, the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts explicitly noted that state courts could interpret 
their state constitutions to provide greater protection to criminal 
defendants.5  They also informed states that if they grant broader 
rights, their highest state courts may shield their judgments from 
review by the Supreme Court, but only if they clearly specify that the 
greater protection arises from state law, not federal law.  As a result, 
state courts gradually began interpreting their constitutions to grant 
greater protection for criminal defendants subject to searches and 
seizures.6  In 2004, twenty-eight states have rejected a particular 
 
 2 See, e.g., David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of 
the “New Judicial Federalism” in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
367, 368 (2001). 
 3 See, e.g., Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., The State Constitution: A Criminal Lawyer’s First 
Line of Defense, 57 ALB. L. REV. 271, 279 (1993) (“During the Warren Court era, 
federal courts suddenly assumed the leading role as protectors of the people from 
intrusions by state and local governments. . . .  In many states, the Federal 
Constitutional decisions were more protective than the state decisions, and thus in 
those states, criminal cases were decided on federal grounds.”). 
 4 See, e.g., James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and 
Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1782 & n.215 
(2003) (declaring that the “United States Supreme Court has decisively halted the 
expansion of federal protection of individual rights,” with “[t]his process . . . most 
notable in the decisions concerning the Fourth Amendment”); Stephen F. Smith, 
The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1337, 1358 (2002) 
(“Instead of overruling Warren Court precedents it deemed to be erroneous, the 
Rehnquist Court has distinguished, created exceptions to, and reinterpreted such 
precedents. . . .  Whatever else might be said about the Court’s approach, it was 
highly effective in producing the ‘law and order’ results Nixon and Reagan promised 
to deliver.”). 
 5 See, e.g., Nina Morrison, Curing “Constitutional Amnesia”: Criminal Procedure under 
State Constitutions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 880, 881 (1998) (noting that “the movement 
towards independent state constitutional analysis—known colloquially as ‘New 
Federalism’—did not gather steam until 1977, when Justice Brennan called on state 
courts to ‘step into the breach’ left by the Burger Court’s rights-narrowing 
jurisprudence” (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977))).  See generally James A. Gardner, 
State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of 
State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1029-30 (2003) (noting that “[n]ineteen state 
constitutions contain a Warrant Clause identical to that found in the Fourth 
Amendment”; but contending that there may be a “significant potential 
difference[]between state and federal versions of protected rights: state constitutions 
may offer a level of protection for such liberties that exceeds the level of protection 
by the U.S. Constitution”). 
 6 See generally Harris, supra note 2, at 368 (“An effort began—’movement’ may be 
too strong a word—to keep alive the Warren Court’s legacy of expanded 
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Fourth Amendment doctrine and have declared broader protection 
under state law.7 
The significance of modern state search and seizure practices, 
however, evades easy characterization.  For example, sometimes the 
Court has supported its Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
determination by indicating that a majority of states currently engage 
in the particular practice.8  At other times, the Court has 
characterized the practice of a minority of states as indicating a 
“trend,”9 one that harmonized with the Court’s reasonableness 
conclusion.  And sometimes modern state practices play no role 
because the Court has constructed its decision by either expanding or 
narrowing precedent.10  In addition, the Court recently described a 
special role for state laws: they may create a legal obligation for 
suspects to identify themselves during an investigative stop, even 
though the Fourth Amendment does not itself create this 
requirement.11  Although states have historically had the power to 
define what actions constitute a state criminal offense,12 the Court’s 
 
constitutional protections for the criminally accused by utilizing state constitutional 
provisions.”). 
 7 See infra note 353.  See generally James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under 
State Constitutions: A Quantitative Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1197 (2000) 
(“Retractions of rights by the Supreme Court . . .  may explain the high level of state 
constitutional policymaking in the search and seizure areas.  Between 1967 and 1984, 
the Supreme Court carved out numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment, thereby reducing the level of available federal 
protections.”). 
 8 See infra Part III.A.1, text accompanying notes 161-71, and Part III.A.3. 
 9 See infra text accompanying notes 283 & 298-321. 
 10 See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004) (concluding that 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) “governs even when an officer does not 
make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle”); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 
U.S. 419, 423-27 (2004) (distinguishing an “information-seeking” roadblock from 
other roadblock cases and applying three factors for balancing established in Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35-40 (2003) 
(upholding officers’ forcible home entry, made fifteen to twenty seconds after 
knocking and announcing their warrant authority, because cited Fourth Amendment 
precedent required  case-by-case analysis); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118-19 
(1998) (refusing “to extend” the “bright-line rule” of United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218 (1973), to a vehicle search incident to a traffic citation); Maryland v. Wilson, 
519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) (extending the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 
(1977) (per curiam), to allow officer to order passenger of lawfully stopped car out 
of vehicle). 
 11 See infra text accompanying notes 243-72. 
 12 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 429, 494 (2004) (positing that when the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003), struck down Texas’ criminal statute banning same-sex sodomy, 
it “reject[ed] the view of the police power as unlimited and plenary,” contending 
that the statute interfered with an individual’s “rightful exercise of liberty”).  By 
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decisions reflect its more modern trust of state search and seizure 
law. 
This interweaving of state practices with federal protections 
raises important federalism questions,13 particularly when the context 
involves criminal law enforcement, because rarely do state legislators 
or state politicians campaign for more measures to protect alleged or 
convicted criminals.14  In addition, the politics of state court judges 
may become a more prominent issue after the Court’s decision to 
strike down a provision that limited state-elected judges from 
vigorous campaigning.15 
 
contrast, when the Court declared that Congress lacked authority under the 
Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, a criminal law, it 
emphasized “first principles,” which included a “healthy balance of power between 
the States and the Federal Government . . . .”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
552 (1995).  Justice Kennedy in his concurrence noted that more than “40 states 
[had] criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds.” 
Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 13 For example, the Court extensively looked to legal sources outside the United 
States Constitution when it held that a Texas statute violated the substantive due 
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment because it  criminalized same-sex 
sodomy, overruling its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).  The Lawrence Court noted that five states had 
“declined to follow [Bowers] in  interpreting provisions in their own state 
constitutions parallel to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. 
at 576. 
 14 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002).  In striking down the 
death penalty as applied to mentally retarded offenders, the Atkins Court noted the 
historic difficulty of passing legislation protecting criminals: 
Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular 
than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent 
crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of 
mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing 
legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides 
powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded 
offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal. 
Id.  See also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 535 & n.2 (2004) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (noting that some state eugenics laws enacted in the 1920s still “persist 
to this day”). 
 15 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785-88 (2002) (holding 
that state statute that barred judicial candidates from announcing views on “disputed 
legal and political issues” violated the First Amendment).  Justice O’Connor in her 
concurrence cited numerous articles indicating that some judicial elections influence 
a judge’s decision whether to impose the death penalty.  Id. at 789-90 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted).  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Judicial Elections and the First 
Amendment, TRIAL, Nov. 2002, at 78 (stating that “White will dramatically change the 
nature of speech in judicial elections”).  Professor Chemerinksy questioned whether 
the White decision created a feasible distinction between “expressing views about 
disputed legal or political issues and making statements that appear to commit them 
with respect to those issues.”  Id. at 81 (questioning the difference between “I believe 
that Roe was wrongly decided and should be overruled” and “I believe that Roe was 
wrongly decided and, if presented with the opportunity, I would vote to overturn the 
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This Article examines the Court’s interest in modern state laws 
as an aid in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  Part I 
highlights the Court’s mistrust of state criminal search and seizure 
procedures when it declared that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fourth Amendment and 
its exclusionary rule; this incorporation—arising from the Court’s 
constructions of “liberty”—thus compelled states to conform their 
procedures and practices to the Fourth Amendment.  This section 
recalls the Court’s distrust of state criminal practices and the 
fundamental nature of due process protections for accused.  Part II 
examines the Court’s declared jurisdictional need to safeguard 
federal interpretive turf.  It discusses the Court’s creation of a “plain 
statement” requirement in 1983 to rebut a presumption for federal 
jurisdiction in state-court cases deciding an issue on both federal and 
state grounds.  Under this requirement, state courts may avoid having 
the United States Supreme Court review their decisions only if they 
clearly state that their more protective decisions rested on 
independent and adequate state grounds, not the Fourth 
Amendment.  This section reveals the Court’s drawing a sharp line 
between federal and state interpretative powers.  By contrast, Part III 
examines the Court’s selective use of modern state practices to assess 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness; it discusses the Court’s use of 
modern state practices to both expand and narrow the protections 
provided by the Fourth Amendment. 
The Article concludes that the Court has, at times, constructed 
the Fourth Amendment with a fragile floor and with an implicit 
understanding that individuals who seek greater protection of their 
liberty, privacy, and personal security need to look to state laws.  
Instead of considering the political unlikelihood of state legislatures 
passing laws to safeguard an alleged criminal’s interest in liberty or of 
elected state judges interpreting state laws to suppress evidence of 
guilt, the Court has looked to the states to aid it in assessing its 
 
decision”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Roy A. Schotland, Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White: Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, JUDGES’ J., Summer 
2002, at 7, 10 (stating that “the impact of elections on judicial independence is 
amplified because so many states have such short terms for judges” and wondering 
whether “more states will end judicial contestable elections altogether”); Stephanie 
Francis Ward, Judging the Judge Candidates: Queries About Family Life, Religion Draw Fire 
in Florida County, A.B.A. J. E-Report, Jan. 23, 2004, WL 3 No. 3 ABAJEREP 3 (noting 
that Florida’s governor-appointed group asked judicial candidates “how they would 
rule on certain matters, such as sodomy and displaying the Ten Commandments in 
the courtroom”); Molly McDonough, Judges Opine on the Issues: Debate May Be Future of 
Judicial Campaigns, A.B.A. J. E-Report, May 23, 2003, WL 2 No. 20 ABAJEREP 3 
(noting that prospective candidates for Pennsylvania Supreme Court positions were 
asked “to state their positions on abortion, gun control and tort reform”). 
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independent federal duty to define the right to liberty, privacy, and 
personal security as safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment.  This 
interpretive practice is odd, but revealing.  It ultimately suggests that 
the Fourth Amendment has an evolving standard, one resembling the 
evolving standard for other provisions safeguarding liberty, personal 
security, and privacy.16  Ultimately, the Court does define the federal 
 
 16 As with its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has selectively cited 
state practices to support its constitutional determination in other contexts.  For 
example, the Court has considered state practices in assessing the application of the 
death penalty, but not sentencing, under the Eighth Amendment. Compare Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (“A claim that punishment is excessive is judged 
not by the standards that presided . . . over the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of 
Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.”), with Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-28 (2003) (noting the rarity of successful challenges to 
state sentencing schemes).  The dissent in Ewing, while agreeing with the standard, 
argued that the California three-strikes law imposed a harsh penalty that would not 
have been imposed by “[t]hirty-three jurisdictions, as well the federal courts.” Id. at 
53 app. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
Similarly, the Court has selectively invoked state practices when assessing the 
protection provided by the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“In all events we 
think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance” in 
analyzing the constitutionality of a criminal statute banning same-sex sodomy), with 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 (1973) (although characterizing modern practices as 
revealing a “trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes . . . by about one-third of 
the States,” admitting that the majority of states currently do not support abortion, a 
position contrary to the “common law, at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century”).  By contrast, 
when creating a national standard for measuring whether a punitive damages award 
violated the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court never mentioned the standards of other states.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) (“A basic principle of federalism is that each 
State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or 
proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine what measure of 
punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”). 
The Court’s selective interest in state practices is also evidenced in its equal 
protection cases.  Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 & n.5, 11-12 (1967) 
(invalidating state statutes banning and punishing interracial marriage on both equal 
protection and substantive due process grounds and noting that during the previous 
“15 years, 14 States ha[d] repealed laws outlawing interracial marriages” and that 
only sixteen states currently prohibited interracial marriage), with Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (allowing race as a factor in law school 
admissions while noting that state laws in “California, Florida, and Washington” ban 
universities from considering an applicant’s race and noting that states “‘may 
perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions 
where the best solution is far from clear’” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).  See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 492-93, 495 (1954) (in declaring that “separate but equal” schools based on 
race violated the Equal Protection Clause, not citing current state practices, but 
instead focusing on the role of modern education and stating that “we cannot turn 
the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when 
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standard, but one today built on a general trust, not mistrust, of states 
to balance the need for intrusion against a person’s and society’s 
interest in liberty, privacy, and personal security.  In time, with the 
Court’s interest in counting how many states allow or forbid various 
practices, states may become the ultimate protectors of liberty. 
The Court’s interest in state laws, created by a separate 
sovereign, resembles the interest of some state courts that also 
consider the practices of other states.  At times state courts have cited 
other state constitutions to justify their interpretation of their 
particular constitution.17  State constitutional law scholar Alan Tarr 
has described a state’s interest in other states as “horizontal 
federalism.”18  This type of federalism resembles the Supreme Court’s 
interest in state practices: a court, whether the United States 
Supreme Court or a state court, interprets its sovereign’s constitution, 
and neither must consider the other sovereign’s interpretation.  
Nonetheless, to give substance to the text of their respective 
constitutions, these courts at times have looked outside their 
 
Plessy v. Ferguson was written.  We must consider public education in the light of its 
full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”). 
 17 See, e.g., People v. Goldson, 682 N.W.2d 479, 489 n.10 (Mich. 2004).  In 
Goldson, the Michigan Supreme Court decided that the state constitution did contain 
an objective good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, which allowed officials to 
prove guilt by using illegally seized evidence.  Id. at 489.  In making this state 
constitutional law determination, the state court created a good faith exception like 
the one established by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth 
Amendment.  See infra note 93.  The state court recognized its separate sovereignty: 
“In interpreting our Constitution, we are not bound by the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution, even where the language is 
identical.” Id. at 484-85.  Nonetheless, the majority opinion rhetorically justified its 
interpretation of the Michigan constitution by citing interpretations of other state 
constitutions and state statutes, even though it declared them to be “entirely 
irrelevant to [its] constitutional analysis.”  Id. at 489 n.10.  The majority noted that 
eleven state constitutions as well as the District of Columbia had a good faith 
exception and five other states had a statutory good faith provision.  Id. (citing the 
state constitution interpretations by courts in Alabama, California, Florida, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin, and 
citing state statutory provisions for Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, and Texas).  
Similarly, the dissent in Goldson listed the state constitutional or statutory 
interpretations of fourteen other states that had rejected an objective good faith 
exception.  Id. at 499 n.26 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (citing Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont). 
 18 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 50-52, 98-99 (1998). In 
contrast to horizontal federalism is a state’s practice of declaring its own constitution 
to mirror the federal constitution, known as a “lockstep” interpretation. See, e.g., 
Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case 
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1502 (2005) 
(noting that in “a clear majority of cases” state courts have “decide[d] to follow, 
rather than diverge from, federal constitutional doctrine”). 
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document for guidance.  In the end, the Supreme Court and state 
courts render decisions under the authority of their sovereign’s 
constitution, but when the Supreme Court looks to modern state laws 
to interpret the Fourth Amendment, it should not fail to scrutinize 
current state laws affecting an extremely unpopular minority—
criminal defendants, a group unlikely to be vigorously protected by 
state legislators or elected state judges. 
I. MISTRUSTING STATES’ PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES:  
THE INCORPORATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND  
THE COURT’S  EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
By declaring that the first ten amendments to the United States 
Constitution (the “Bill of Rights”) applied only to the federal 
government and not to the states, the Court, in an 1833 decision, 
drew a sharp line between limits placed on federal authority and state 
authority.19  Although this line suggested a sharp distinction between 
restraints imposed on the federal government and the states, in time 
the doctrine of “selective incorporation” ended up giving individuals 
most of the protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, but only 
because the Court declared that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated these rights.  “Liberty,” as 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
ultimately became a springboard for compelling states to conform 
their criminal procedures to the Fourth Amendment.  The Court’s 
landmark decisions in Wolf v. Colorado20 and Mapp v. Ohio21 reveal the 
Court’s vacillating views of state practices.  Initially the Court 
respected states’ views of adequate remedies for illegal police actions, 
but later it mistrusted the states’ remedial schemes.22 
 
 19 Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).  See also 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 397 (1914) (applying Fourth Amendment 
and exclusionary rule to unreasonable searches and seizures by federal officials, but 
not to actions of municipal police officers).  Because the Weeks Court did not view 
the Fourth Amendment to reach the action of state officials, it recognized different 
standards for federal and state courts, while at the same time emphasizing the 
importance of having an exclusionary rule to suppress evidence derived from illegal 
searches and seizures by federal officials.  Id. at 393.  The Weeks Court declared that, 
without the exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment “is of no value” and “might as 
well be stricken from the Constitution.”  Id. 
 20 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 21 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 22 See generally Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State 
Constitutional Law and Selective Incorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 72 
(1996) (“Although rarely if ever acknowledged in Supreme Court cases, undoubtedly 
because of the impolitic nature of the assertion, incorporation surely rested upon a 
measure of disrespect for state courts.”). 
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In Wolf, the Court applied the Fourth Amendment to the states, 
but not the federal exclusionary rule, which bars the government 
from using illegally seized evidence in its case in chief to prove guilt.  
By refusing to impose the exclusionary rule on the states, the Court 
relied upon the practices of a majority of states, which had rejected 
the exclusionary rule.  By contrast, the Mapp Court twelve years later 
reversed Wolf in part by declaring that the exclusionary rule did apply 
to the states.  It explained that the state practices it had relied on in 
Wolf were “not basically relevant to”23 deciding whether the federal 
exclusionary rule applies to the states.  An examination of these 
contrasting decisions and their aftermath lays the foundation for 
understanding the modern Court’s interest in ascertaining state 
practices to shape the substantive contours of the Fourth 
Amendment.24 
A. Liberty as the Foundation for Incorporating the Fourth Amendment: 
Wolf v. Colorado 
When the Court decided Wolf v. Colorado in 1949, it held that the 
Fourth Amendment applied to the states, but that the exclusionary 
rule did not.  Although the Court in Mapp reversed that part of Wolf 
refusing to impose the exclusionary rule on the states, the Wolf 
Court’s discussion of both issues—incorporation of the Fourth 
Amendment and the lack of need for a rule of exclusion—frame the 
modern Court’s interpretative task in defining the scope of the 
 
 23 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. 
 24 As the Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the provisions of other amendments, it frequently looked 
to state practices for guidance in determining due process.  See, e.g., Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 161 (1968) (holding that Due Process Clause of 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated federal jury trial guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment by using the standard of whether the right was “fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice” and characterizing practices of “49 of 50” states as 
“objective criteria” to determine the seriousness of a crime requiring a jury trial); 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 219, 220 n.5, 222-23 (1967) (holding that 
North Carolina’s indefinite postponement of prosecution by indictment violated 
Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial as incorporated by Due Process Clause and 
noting that “every other state court” that had considered the question rejected North 
Carolina’s practice and listing the states’ nolle prosequi practices); Pointer v. Texas, 
380 U.S. 400, 404 note, 406  (1965) (holding that Sixth Amendment’s “confrontation 
guarantee” was safeguarded by Due Process Clause, and citing “[s]tate constitutional 
and statutory provisions similar to the Sixth Amendment”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (deciding that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, not by 
considering whether the practice is “fair” in some countries, but rather whether it 
was “in ours”; and citing to twenty-two states that requested the Court to overrule its 
prior denial of this right to state criminal defendants). 
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Fourth Amendment.  Both its view of “liberty” and its strong 
consideration of the states’ search and seizure practices resonate with 
the modern Court’s interpretative struggle to strike the balance of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 
By declaring that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, 
the Wolf Court relied on the incorporation standard articulated in 
Palko v. Connecticut,25 a standard also cited by the modern Court to 
decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects a newly asserted liberty interest.  Applying the 
Palko standard, the Court questioned whether the Fourth 
Amendment rights were “‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,’”26 signifying rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court viewed “liberty” as evolving, not 
“petrified as of any one time.”27  The Court noted that due process 
protects this fundamental liberty right and signifies a “living 
principle,”28 one “not confined within a permanent catalogue of what 
may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essential of 
fundamental rights.”29  By viewing due process as an evolving source 
of protection, the Court explained that its judicial role did not 
involve drawing a clear line, but rather employing a “gradual and 
empiric process.”30 
The Wolf Court then characterized the Fourth Amendment’s 
“core” as protecting a person’s “privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
police,” a right “basic to a free society.”31  It unanimously held that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated 
the Fourth Amendment.  By contrast, the Court recognized different 
remedial schemes for federal and state officials who conduct 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  For federal officials, the 
exclusionary rule applied, a rule that the Court imposed in 1914 in 
Weeks v. United States.32  For state officials, state remedial schemes 
satisfied the Palko standard.33 
The Court justified its decision on two grounds: English 
practices and the practices of a majority of American states.34  First, it 
 
 25 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 26 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 33 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30 n.1. 
 34 Id. at 29-31. 
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explained that it must “hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential 
ingredient of the [Fourth Amendment] right” because “most of the 
English-speaking world does not regard [it] as vital.”  It looked to ten 
“jurisdictions within the United Kingdom and the British 
Commonwealth of Nations which [had] passed on the question” of 
exclusion, noting that “none” had applied exclusion.35 
Second, the Court closely scrutinized states’ practices both 
before and after Weeks.  It noted that before Weeks, twenty-seven states 
had considered whether to apply the exclusionary rule: twenty-six 
opposed using the exclusionary rule, and one state “anticipated the 
Weeks doctrine.”36  The Court explained that after Weeks, forty-seven 
states weighed in on the exclusionary rule: twenty states had 
considered it for the first time, with six states appling the 
exclusionary rule and fourteen rejecting it.37  It also described the 
changes in the twenty-six states that had considered exclusion prior 
to Weeks: ten adopted the exclusionary rule either by “overruling or 
distinguishing their prior decisions,” sixteen states still rejected the 
exclusionary rule, and one of these twenty-six states “repudiated its 
prior formulation of the Weeks doctrine.”38  The Wolf Court 
summarized these details: “As of today 31 States reject the Weeks 
doctrine, 16 States are in agreement with it.”39 
To remedy unreasonable searches and seizures by state officials, 
the Court looked to state laws to safeguard the rights protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.  It found states’ remedies adequate, “if 
consistently enforced.”40  These state remedies included suing police 
officers for trespass, suing police officers who apply for invalid 
warrants, suing the magistrate who acted without jurisdiction, and 
criminally prosecuting involved officials.41  It also viewed community 
pressure against law enforcement officials as another safeguard.42 
In the end, a majority of the Wolf Court deeply trusted states to 
protect Fourth Amendment rights.  It found state practices 
persuasive: “We cannot brush aside the experience of States which 
deem the incidence of such [illegal] conduct by the police too slight 
to call for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but 
 
 35 Id. at 30. 
 36 Id. at 29. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949). 
 40 Id. at 31. 
 41 Id. at 30 n.1. 
 42 Id. at 32. 
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by overriding the relevant rules of evidence.”43  It then offered a six 
and one-half page appendix listing all of the state practices to which 
it had cited.44 
For dissenting Justices Murphy and Rutledge, trusting state 
practices did not comport with the Palko standard.45  They rejected 
counting the states to decide the due process standard: “[W]e should 
[not] decide due process questions by simply taking a poll of the 
rules of various jurisdictions.”46  They also described state 
“remedies”—both civil and criminal—as “illusory.”47 They viewed 
criminal prosecution by states as intertwining the illegal conduct of 
police officers with the actions of prosecutors and the judiciary.48  
First, they seriously doubted that a district attorney would “prosecute 
himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and 
seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates 
have ordered.”49  Second, they thought that admitting illegally seized 
evidence would “have [a] tragic effect upon public respect for our 
judiciary” by allowing “lawlessness by officers of the law.”50  In 
addition, the dissenting Justices highlighted the lack of case law 
addressing trespass suits against police officers.51 
The Wolf Court thus separated the question of application of the 
Fourth Amendment from the question of exclusion as a required 
remedy.  The Court created distinct practices in federal and state 
courts by relying on English practices, the practices of a majority of 
states, and their remedies for illegal conduct.  Twelve years later, the 
Court in Mapp v. Ohio52 not only rejected this reliance on state 
practices and remedies, but also harmonized federal and state 
practices, ending the “asymmetry which Wolf imported into the law.”53 
 
 43 Id. at 31-32. 
 44 Id. at 33-39. 
 45 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 46 Id. at 46 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 47 Id. at 42 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 48 Id. at 42, 46 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 49 Id. at 42 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 50 Id. at 46 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 51 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 52 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 53 Id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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B. Liberty and “Healthy” Federalism as the Foundation for Applying 
the Exclusionary Rule to State Search and Seizure Practices 
In 1961 the Mapp Court reversed Wolf in part by holding that the 
exclusionary rule applied to state criminal prosecutions.54  To justify 
its reversal, the Court recast the role of state practices relied on by 
the Wolf Court.  The Mapp Court twice characterized its prior review 
of state practices as “not basically relevant to a decision that the 
exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the Fourth 
Amendment”55 as incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  It also characterized state practices as 
“factual considerations,”56 which had changed by 1961.  In addition, it 
offered a different view of liberty, while still using the Palko Court’s 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” standard.57 
The Court undermined the relevance of state practices in several 
ways.  First, it described the Wolf Court’s citing of state practice as a 
factual grounding, a grounding that had shifted since Wolf.58 While 
describing how state practices had changed, the majority and 
dissenting opinions highlighted different aspects of state practices.  
The Mapp majority cited states’ practices since the Wolf decision: 
“[N]ow, despite the Wolf case, more than one-half of those since 
passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision, have 
wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule” of exclusion.59  
For its source, the Mapp majority cited the detailed appendix in Elkins 
v. United States, a 1960 decision which listed each state’s practice 
before Weeks, before Wolf, and after Wolf.60  While conceding that 
more states since Wolf had adopted the exclusionary rule, the dissent, 
by contrast, countered with a “recent survey” that “indicate[d] that at 
present one-half of the States still adhere to the common-law non-
exclusionary rule, and one, Maryland, retains the rule as to 
felonies.”61 
Second, both the majority and the dissent declared that state 
practices offered little guidance in deciding the constitutional 
question of whether the exclusionary rule applied to the states.  The 
 
 54 Id. at 657. 
 55 Id. at 651. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 655. 
 58 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, app. at 224-33 (1960)). 
 61 Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Julius Berman & Paul Oberst, 
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by an Unconstitutional Search and Seizure—Federal 
Problems, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 525, 532-33 (1960)). 
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Mapp Court stated that these “factual considerations . . . , while not 
basically relevant to the constitutional consideration, could not, in 
any analysis, now be deemed controlling.”62  Similarly, the dissent 
declared that states’ practices were “beside the point, as the majority 
itself indeed seems to recognize.”63  It viewed the question before the 
Court as a constitutional question, one in which “the disparity of 
views among the States on this point” reveals “that the judgment 
involved is a debatable one.”64 
Third, the Mapp Court disagreed with the Wolf Court’s view of 
states having adequate remedies.65  Instead it highlighted California’s 
adoption of the exclusionary rule because “‘other remedies [had] 
completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional 
provisions.’”66  In this context, the failures of other states now became 
relevant.67  The Mapp Court cited twenty-three state statutes, noting 
that “[l]ess than half of the States have any criminal provisions 
relating directly to unreasonable searches and seizures.”68 
The Mapp Court thus used state practices in contrasting ways: It 
declared them not relevant to the constitutional question, but 
 
 62 Id. at 653. 
 63 Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 64 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. at 651. 
 66 Id. (citing People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (Cal. 1955)).  When selecting an 
important state for consideration, the Justices have highlighted those states that 
support their views of the exclusionary rule.  For example, the dissent in Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), a case decided one year before Wolf, mentioned 
the same California case later cited by the majority in Wolf, but countered with the 
state practice of New York.  Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 242 (1960) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Justice Frankfurter used the practices of New York and 
other states to refute the Elkin majority’s characterization of states’ adoption of the 
exclusionary rule as “‘seemingly inexorable.’”  Id. (citing Wolf, 364 U.S. at 219): 
[W]hat impresses me is the obduracy of high-minded state courts, like 
that of New York under the leadership of Judge Cardozo, in refusing to 
adopt the federal rule of exclusion. Indeed, this impressive insistence 
of States not to follow the Weeks exclusionary rule was the controlling 
consideration of the decision in Wolf not to read it into the 
requirement of “due process” under the Fourteenth Amendment.  As 
the material the Court has collected shows, fully half the States have 
refused to adhere to our Weeks rule, nearly fifty years after this Court 
has deemed it appropriate for the federal administration of criminal 
justice. 
Id.  The Court’s interest in state practices to help shape the scope of its federal 
supervisory powers reveals its underlying concern with “healthy federalism,” as 
implicated by the “silver platter doctrine.”  See infra text accompanying notes 76-86. 
 67 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652 (stating that the “experience of California that . . . other 
remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other 
States”). 
 68 Id. at 652 & n.7. 
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relevant in overruling the Wolf Court’s rejection of the exclusionary 
rule.  To answer the constitutional question, the Court relied on its 
prior Palko standard and its view of “‘healthy federalism.’”69  Although 
six Justices voted to suppress illegally seized evidence,70  a majority of 
the Court did not clearly specify whether the Constitution required 
exclusion or whether the Court only created the remedy to effectively 
safeguard Fourth Amendment interests.71 
When applying the Palko standard, the Court reiterated that Wolf 
had viewed the Fourth Amendment as protecting “privacy.”72  Now, 
however, it viewed exclusion as “an essential part of the right to 
privacy.”73  The Court declared that “without that rule freedom from 
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly 
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish 
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard 
as a freedom ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”74  The Mapp 
Court invoked the Wolf Court’s discussion of privacy to expand its 
reach to the exclusionary rule.  This evolving privacy and liberty 
interest, “‘basic to a free society,’”75 now included the exclusionary 
rule as a remedy. 
 
 69 Id. at 657 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221). 
 70 Justice Clark wrote the opinion for the Court joined by Justices Brennan and 
Warren; Justices Black and Douglas wrote separate concurring opinions; and Justice 
Stewart concurred on suppressing the evidence, but joined the dissent in part.  Thus, 
six voted to suppress the illegally seized evidence.  Id. at 654-72.  Justice Harlan 
dissented, joined in full by Justices Frankfurter and Whitaker.  Id. at 672 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 71 The progeny of Weeks and Mapp, however, now clearly hold that the 
Constitution does not compel exclusion in all circumstances when officers conduct 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
905-06 (1984).  In Leon, the Court described its inconsistent characterizations of 
foundation for the exclusionary rule: 
Language in opinions of this Court and of individual Justices has 
sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of 
the Fourth Amendment [citing, inter alia, Mapp], or that the rule is 
required by the conjunction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
[citing, inter alia, Justice Black’s concurrence in Mapp].  These 
implications need not detain us long.  The Fifth Amendment theory 
has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time [citing Andresen v. 
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976)], and the Fourth Amendment “has 
never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.”  [Citing Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)]. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06. 
 72 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56. 
 73 Id. at 656. 
 74 Id. at 655 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)). 
 75 Id. at 656 (quoting Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27). 
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The Wolf Court also justified its extension of the exclusionary 
rule by invoking “‘healthy federalism,’” as characterized in Elkins v. 
United States.76  In Elkins, the Court had invoked its federal supervisory 
powers to bar federal officials from using evidence seized by state 
officials who conducted unreasonable searches and seizures.  
Ironically, in addressing this issue, known as the “silver platter 
doctrine,”77 the Elkins Court split five to four, in large part because 
the Justices had dramatically different views of what constituted 
“healthy federalism.” 
For the Elkins majority “healthy federalism” meant 
“avoid[ing] . . . needless conflict between state and federal courts.”78  
It viewed federal officials’ attempt to use such state-seized evidence as 
“defeat[ing] the state’s effort to assure obedience to the Federal 
Constitution.”79  While encouraging “cooperation between state and 
federal law enforcement officers,”80 the Elkins majority viewed its 
rejection of the silver platter doctrine as protecting against state 
officials’ “inducement . . . and evasion” of the Fourth Amendment 
standard.81  It declared that a federal court, when considering 
whether state officials conducted an unreasonable search or seizure, 
“must make an independent inquiry, whether or not there has been 
such an inquiry by a state court, and irrespective of how any such 
inquiry may have turned out.”82  More significantly, the Elkins majority 
stated, “[t]he test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one 
state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another 
may have colorably suppressed.”83 
By contrast, “healthy federalism” for the Elkins dissent meant 
trusting state officials and, for reasons of comity, deferring to a state-
court ruling that officials had unlawfully seized evidence.84  The 
dissent highlighted the facts of the cases before the Court, in which 
state courts had suppressed evidence.85  More important to modern 
litigation, the dissent emphasized that some states give individuals 
 
 76 Id. at 657 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221). 
 77 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208 n.2. 
 78 Id. at 221. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 222. 
 82 Id. at 224. 
 83 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960). 
 84 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 243, 245-47 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 85 Id. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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greater protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment.86  
From its perspective, the majority’s rule would “encourage state 
illegalities” because a federal court could admit evidence “directly 
contrary to state law.”87  For the dissent, the Court’s decision applying 
the exclusionary rule to the states was “pregnant with new 
disharmonies between federal and state authorities and between 
federal and state courts.”88 
Yet, for the Mapp Court, “healthy federalism” arose from having 
both state and federal officials’ evidence suppressed if their actions 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  It politely excused federal officials 
as “being human” when they had previously complied with requests 
from state officials in non-exclusionary states to give them evidence 
that federal officials could not use in federal court.89  By harmonizing 
the exclusionary rule to apply to the actions of both federal and state 
officials, the Mapp Court viewed its ruling as promoting “[f]ederal–
state cooperation in the solution of crime.”90  To allow for different 
standards, the Court stated, would be “to breed legitimate suspicion 
of ‘working arrangements’ whose results are equally tainted.”91 
The Mapp Court, however, never hinted how to address the 
Elkins dissent’s concern about states that grant greater protection 
than that provided by the Fourth Amendment.  For now, it took 
healthy federalism to signify equal application of the exclusionary 
rule to federal and state officials for violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Modern federal courts, however, have seen this 
harmony disappear as states grant greater protection under their 
constitutions and statutes than that provided by the Fourth 
Amendment.92 
 
 86 Id. at 245 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“So comity plays no part at all, and the 
fruits of illegal law enforcement may well be admitted in federal courts directly 
contrary to state law.”). 
 87 Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Justice Frankfurter viewed the Court’s ruling 
as allowing state officials to give federal officials evidence seized in violation of state 
law that was more protective than the Fourth Amendment.  He argued that under 
the majority’s rule, a “state officer who disobeys [a state regulation] needs only to 
turn his evidence over to the federal prosecutor, who may freely utilize it under 
today’s innovation in disregard of the disciplinary policy of the State’s exclusionary 
rule.”  Id. at 245-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 88 Id. at 243 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 89 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See, e.g., James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure: 
Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?, 55 MD. L. REV. 223, 250 (1996).  Professor 
Diehm has described how the harmony that Mapp created disappeared when state 
courts began to interpret their state constitutions and statutes to provide greater 
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By applying the Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule to 
the states, the Court thus read the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to protect privacy as “implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty.”  The Court initially gave the states time to decide 
whether the exclusionary rule applied in their proceedings, but after 
time, it characterized the states’ trend as one towards inclusion, 
despite a vociferous dissent rejecting this characterization and 
offering a different view of healthy federalism.  It deemed the 
exclusionary rule to be a needed and effective remedy. 
With the Mapp decision harmonizing exclusionary practices in 
1961, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts began narrowing both the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule.93  
 
rights than the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 252-53.  He noted three types of conflicts: 
federal criminal prosecutions using evidence derived from state officials, state 
prosecutions using evidence derived from federal officials, and state prosecutions 
using evidence derived from states with different standards than the prosecuting 
state.  Id.  With these conflicts, “criminal procedure has come full circle.” Id. at 253. 
Compelling reasons may exist not to apply the law of the forum, but 
the failure to do so can also lead to problems.  If a state court does not 
apply its more stringent state standards to federal officers, similarly 
situated state defendants will be treated differently, the admissibility of 
evidence will be determined by the badge of the officer rather than the 
legality of the act, and silver platter abuses will be encouraged.  Similar 
problems develop in interstate situations where the court may choose 
to apply the law of another state.  These were exactly the injustices 
noted by pre-Mapp authors that led to the Court’s decision in Mapp. 
Id. at 252-53.  As of 1996, Professor Diehm had discerned that “most federal courts” 
and “many scholars” support applying federal standards in federal courts.  Id. at 251.  
For state prosecutions, Diehm observed that “many state courts” seemed compelled 
to apply federal standards to federal officials’ testifying in state court.  Id. at 252. 
 93 For example, the modern Court significantly limited the exclusionary rule by 
creating a good faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).  
Under this exception, prosecutors could use in their case in chief evidence from an 
unreasonable search and seizure if police officers had acted in “objective good faith” 
in obtaining the evidence.  Id. at 919 n.20.  To create this exception, the Court 
explicitly invoked a “costs and benefits” standard, which was implicit in the its 
general reasonableness balancing test under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 913.  In 
this context, however, the Court did not cite state practices to support its new 
limitation.  Instead, it cited prior concurring and dissenting opinions and one 
opinion from the Fifth Circuit en banc, which had explicitly created a good faith 
exception.  Id. at 913 n.11.  The Leon Court’s extension grew to apply to other 
objectively unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment; these exceptions 
extended prosecutors’ ability to use illegally seized evidence to prove guilt.  See, e.g., 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995) (holding that if a court clerk caused a 
computer error that led a police officer to mistakenly believe that an arrest warrant 
for a stopped driver existed, the exclusionary rule would not apply to the evidence 
the officer seized in reliance on this judicial officer); Illinois v Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 
356-57, 360 n.17 (1987) (holding that if a police officer acted within the scope of a 
state statute, which might be unconstitutional, his actions were objectively reasonable 
and the prosecution could use seized evidence to prove guilt); Massachusetts v. 
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Encouraged by Justice Brennan94 and other state and federal supreme 
court justices,95 state courts eventually interpreted their state 
constitutions and statutes to provide greater protection than that 
provided by the Fourth Amendment.  State courts thus wrote 
opinions referring to state provisions as well as the Fourth 
Amendment. When these cases came to the United States Supreme 
Court, the Court addressed its jurisdiction to review decisions that 
not only discussed the Fourth Amendment, but also relied on state 
law.  In 1983, in Michigan v. Long,96 the Court opted for a rule that 
diminished the influence of state-court opinions and strongly 
safeguarded federal interpretative turf.97 
II. PROTECTING FEDERAL INTERPRETATIVE TURF:  
THE “PLAIN STATEMENT” REQUIREMENT AND ITS AFTERMATH 
In Michigan v. Long, the Court admitted that the selective 
incorporation doctrine had created a strong federal presence in state 
criminal proceedings by requiring states to comply with most of the 
provisions in the Bill of Rights.98  As a result, the Long Court declared 
a special need to clarify when it has jurisdiction from a state-court 
judgment that referred both to the Fourth Amendment and state law.  
It also characterized its prior jurisdictional case law as inconsistent 
 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 984 (1984) (applying Leon’s newly created good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule to a magistrate’s “technical error” in issuing a 
search warrant).  In Leon, Evans, and Krull, the Court stated that the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule was to deter unreasonable conduct by police officers, not errors 
made by judges, clerks, or state legislative bodies.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17; Evans, 
514 U.S. at 14; Krull, 480 U.S. at 350.  As a result, locating the source of unreasonable 
or erroneous conduct significantly affected the Court’s decision to apply or not to 
apply the exclusionary rule. 
 94 See, e.g., Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 95 See, e.g., Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bill of Rights, 9 U. 
BALT. L. REV.  379 (1980).  For a detailed summary of the numerous justices 
encouraging the state courts to interpret their constitutions and statutes, see WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE, 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.11(a) (2003). 
 96 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 97 See, e.g., Michael Esler, Michigan v. Long: A Twenty Year Retrospective, 66 ALB. L. 
REV. 835, 855 (2003) (stating that Long “has been most successful in expanding the 
meaning of what constitutes federal legal grounds”).  For a discussion of Long, see 
infra Part II. 
 98 Long, 463 U.S. at 1042 n.8 (“It is not surprising that this Court has become 
more interested in the application and development of federal law by state courts in 
the light of the recent significant expansion of federally created standards that we 
have imposed on the States.”). 
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and the issue as “vexing.”99  It created a new presumption favoring 
review by the United States Supreme Court: 
[W]hen . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily 
on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when 
the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground 
is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the 
most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case 
the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do 
so.100 
Under the Court’s rule, a state court may block review by the Court if 
it writes a “plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal 
cases . . . do not themselves compel the result that the court has 
reached.”101  By creating this rule, the Court protected its federal 
interpretative turf. 
The Court attempted to draw a sharp line between its own 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and those of state courts.  
The Court viewed its three prior approaches as undermining 
“federal–state relations.”102  Under those approaches, the Court 
previously had dismissed the case for lack of clarity, retained 
jurisdiction and sought clarification from the state court, or 
determined on its own when the state court’s decision rested on an 
independent and adequate state ground.103  It viewed its rule of 
presumptive jurisdiction as providing “state judges with a clearer 
opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal 
interference.”104 
Although the Court underscored that the new jurisdictional rule 
would fulfill an “important need for uniformity in federal law,”105 it 
nevertheless allowed for an exception.  Under the exception, the 
 
 99 Id. at 1038. 
 100 Id. at 1040-41.  One year after Long, the Court replaced the “and” with an “or” 
in the phrase “and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law 
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.”  Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 
497 n.7 (1984) (“Ordinarily, we have jurisdiction to review a state-court judgment, if 
the decision “appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the 
federal law,” or if the “adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is 
not clear from the face of the opinion.” (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41) 
(emphasis added)). 
 101 Long, 463 U.S. at 1041. 
 102 Id. at 1039. 
 103 Id. at 1038-39. 
 104 Id. at 1041. 
 105 Id. at 1040. 
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Court could take a different action in “certain circumstances” when 
“necessary or desirable.”106 
When deciding that it would presume jurisdiction from state-
court judgments regardless of whether the state court had accepted 
or rejected the federal claim, the Long Court explicitly rejected 
dissenting Justice Stevens’ view that the Court should not review cases 
when a state court has protected a criminal defendant’s asserted 
federal right.107  For Justice Stevens, the Court’s “primary role . . . is to 
make sure that persons who seek to vindicate federal rights have been 
fairly heard.”108  The Court, however, rejected this type of limited 
jurisdiction because it had a different perspective on federalism.  For 
the majority, federalism signified a strong need for a uniform view of 
federal law;109 for the dissent, federalism signified that states 
constituted a separate sovereign, one free from the actions of another 
as long as it protected the rights safeguarded by the other 
sovereign.110  The dissent dramatically distinguished between 
sovereigns by characterizing the Supreme Court’s presumptive review 
as similar to the United States Supreme Court reviewing a judgment 
from the Republic of Finland’s court that had acquitted a criminal 
defendant by interpretating the United States Constitution.111  For the 
dissent, a state court protecting a criminal defendant’s asserted 
constitutional rights resembled a judgment similar to the 
hypothetical ruling from the Republic of Finland.112  By contrast, the 
Long majority viewed federalism as affording the Court a necessary 
role in defining the boundaries of constitutional protections.113 
The Long Court also protected its interpretative turf by rejecting 
the dissent’s argument that review would squander “scarce federal 
judicial resources.”114  The majority viewed the presumptive 
jurisdiction rule as improving “both justice and judicial 
administration.”115  By requiring a “plain statement” from the state 
 
 106 Id. at 1041 n.6.  After Long, the Court in a per curiam decision nevertheless 
remanded for clarification, without explicitly invoking this exception.  Capital Cities 
Media, Inc. v. Toole, 466 U.S. 378, 379 (1984) (per curiam).  Justice Ginsburg has 
indicated that she supports this exception.  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 26 (1995) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 107 Long, 463 U.S. at 1042 n.8. 
 108 Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109 Id. at 1040, 1042 n.8. 
 110 See id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 113 See id. at 1041. 
 114 Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 115 Id. at 1041. 
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court, the majority explained that it would “avoid the danger of . . .  
rendering advisory opinions.”116 
Despite the Court’s concerns about advisory opinions, its 
decisions since Long  have frequently had no effect on the particular 
case for which it granted review.  State courts, as recognized by the 
Long Court,117 have, on remand, nevertheless decided in favor of 
criminal defendants by applying more protective state constitutions 
or statutes.118 
Since the Long Court created this presumptive jurisdictional 
rule, state courts have more frequently interpreted their state search 
and seizure provisions to provide greater protection than that 
provided by the Fourth Amendment.119  The meaning of the Long rule 
depends upon one’s view of federalism.  Some scholars have declared 
that the Court “has applied the ‘plain statement’ rule without 
difficulty,”120 while nonetheless stating that state courts have “no 
need . . . to draw a sharp distinction between” federal and state 
questions.121 Some scholars have seen the Long rule as one forcing 
state-court justices to be accountable for their decisions,122 with fearful 
state-elected judges interpreting their state laws to be in “lockstep” 
with federal law.123  Others have viewed the Court’s rule as allowing 
 
 116 See id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 951 n. 8 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that state courts “on many occasions” have affirmed “the original 
holding on state-law grounds” after reversal and remand by the United States 
Supreme Court); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 32 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting that after the Long decision, state courts reinstated their prior judgments in 
“26.7%” of cases reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court); see also Robert F. 
Williams, The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
211, 221 (2003).  But see id. at 219-20 (listing state courts that upon reversal and 
remand changed their interpretation of state law to mirror the federal standard). 
 119 See infra note 353. 
 120 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: 
FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK §114, at 1076 n.107 (2002); see also Michael E. Solimine, 
Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 
341 (2002) (“Difficulty in compliance with the plain statement rule likewise cannot 
be seriously contended.”). 
 121 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 120, §114, at 1074 n.100. 
 122 See, e.g., Stewart G. Pollock, The Court and State Constitutional Law, in THE 
BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION? 244, 245 (Bernard 
Schwartz ed., 1998) (citing Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 
78 JUDICATURE 25, 30 (1994)); Solimine, supra note 120, at 342 (citing Ann Althouse, 
Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 
979, 989 (1993). 
 123 Solimine, supra note 120, at 342 (citing Edward Hartnett, Why Is the United 
States Supreme Court Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 907, 
981-82 (1997)). 
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state courts to enter a territory with “hidden dangers.”124  Still, others 
have surmised that the Court hoped that states would not expand 
their laws, but would rather interpret their laws to mirror the Court’s 
interpretations.125 
Even though the Long rule protected federal interpretative turf, 
the Court has ironically at times looked to modern state laws to shape 
the contours of the Fourth Amendment.  Because the Court has 
selectively invoked modern state practices to ascertain the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope, such a practice does not intrude on the turf 
guarded by the Long rule.  Rather, this practice highlights the 
principle that the Fourth Amendment has an evolving standard of 
reasonableness. 
III. SELECTIVELY TRUSTING STATES TO ENACT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
REASONABLE POLICE PRACTICES 
In several important decisions assessing the reasonableness of 
officers’ seizing and arresting suspects, the Court has attempted to 
justify its determination in part by citing modern state practices.  In 
these decisions, the Court has extensively analyzed state practices as a 
factor in determining reasonableness.  The Court has viewed state 
practices as relevant to its task of defining Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness.  The Court has used state practices in different ways: 
Sometimes it has used the practice of the majority of states to support 
its reasonableness determination, and sometimes it has ascertained 
the states’ “trend” away from a majority of practices.  The Court has 
also explicitly trusted state legislatures when interpreting the scope of 
the exclusionary rule.  In addition, the Court has also refused to 
closely scrutinize state officials’ allocation of policing resources when 
considering the means they selected to further a law enforcement 
goal.  The Court’s interest in current state police standards suggests a 
unique type of “Fourth Amendment federalism,” one in which the 
Court’s rhetorical deference suggests a trust in the states.  The 
Court’s decisions, however, do not uniformly reflect a deep trust of 
 
 124 Pollock, supra note 122, at 246. 
 125 Solimine, supra note 120, at 340.  In an opinion decided shortly before the 
Long decision, Chief Justice Burger blamed Florida law for the “untoward result” that 
a Florida statute had created by requiring suppression of more than “100 pounds of 
marihuana discovered aboard a fishing vessel.”  Florida v. Cassal, 462 U.S. 637, 637 
(1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).  Although Chief Justice Burger concurred because 
he viewed state law as constituting an independent and adequate ground barring 
review, he urged voters to change the law in order to have a “rational law 
enforcement” system.  Id. at 639. 
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states.  The Court has limited its trust by using state practices as a 
factor and, more importantly, it has selectively deferred to state laws. 
Yet, in other Fourth Amendment decisions, the Court has not 
mentioned state practices in deciding Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness.126  The Court’s selective use of state practices 
resembles its earlier interpretive struggles when deciding whether the 
Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule applied to the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In 
the end, the Court’s selective use of state practices underscores the 
evolving protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. 
A. Citing State Laws and Constitutions to Justify Important Arrest 
Rules 
The Court has looked to state practices in constructing 
important arrest rules.  Although the Court has not characterized 
these practices as dispositive in deciding the reasonableness of an 
arrest, it has used them to support its ultimate determination.  In 
three significant decisions between 1976 to 2001, the Court examined 
state practices and pronounced broad, foundational principles for 
seizing and arresting suspects.  In 1976, the Court held in United States 
v. Watson127 that officers did not need a warrant or exigent 
circumstances to arrest a suspect in public when the officers had 
 
 126 During the 2003–2004 term, the Court generally interpreted precedent to 
justify its Fourth Amendment interpretations.  See Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 
615, 623-24 (2004) (distinguishing and extending precedent to uphold search of a 
vehicle incident to the arrest of a “recent occupant”); United States v. Flores-
Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-56 (2004) (citing old and modern federal statutes and 
extending precedent to uphold government’s authority to disassemble and search 
gas tank at border, even absent reasonable suspicion; arguing that states’ practices 
would not be logically relevant to government’s interest in safeguarding borders); 
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562-64 (2004) (justifying decision by citing Fourth 
Amendment particularity requirement and precedent, and holding search warrant 
facially invalid and denying qualified immunity to police officer who sought and 
executed the warrant); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425-28 (2003) (distinguishing 
precedent and looking to “community hostility” to limit official’s use of roadblocks in 
which officers stop and question drivers about past crimes); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 
U.S. 366, 372-74 (2003) (extending precedent to uphold officer’s probable cause 
determination that car occupant had possessed an illegal drug, despite presence of 
other individuals in the car stopped for speeding); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 
31, 36 n.2, 38 (2003) (citing in a footnote state practices about “no-knock warrants,” 
which were irrelevant to the Court’s holding, based on precedent, that officers acted 
reasonably by waiting fifteen to twenty seconds after knocking and announcing their 
search warrant authority to look for drugs in a residence).  But see Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459-61 (2004) (citing current state statutes as 
well as precedent). 
 127 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
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probable cause to believe that he had committed a felony.128  Four 
years later, in Payton v. New York,129 the Court held that officers did 
need an arrest warrant to enter a suspect’s home, even when they had 
probable cause to believe that the suspect had committed a felony.130  
Recently, in Atwater v. Lago Vista,131 the Court expressed deep trust in 
state laws and held that an officer acted reasonably when he arrested 
a driver for violating traffic laws, even when state law provided only a 
fine as a penalty for the offenses.132  By citing the practices of a 
majority of states, the Court underscored the need for a workable 
rule for police officers, but also one with extensive support among 
the states. 
1. A Majority of States Supporting Court’s Warrantless 
Arrest Rule: United States v. Watson 
In United States v. Watson, the Court upheld a federal statute133 
that had authorized postal officials, who have probable cause to 
believe that a suspect “has committed or is committing such a felony,” 
to make a warrantless arrest.134  To uphold this statute, the Court used 
numerous sources to arrive at its reasonableness determination.  It 
looked to old and current federal statutes, the “ancient common-law 
rule”135 as reflected in its precedents, old and current state practices, 
and a model code proposed by the American Law Institute.136  It used 
state practices to support its viewing the common-law rule as a 
foundational Fourth Amendment rule.137  For the Court, the common 
law allowed an officer “to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor 
or felony committed in his presence . . . if there was reasonable 
ground for making the arrest.”138  The Court used state-court 
decisions from 1814 to 1866 to show that “the common-law rule . . . 
generally prevailed in the States.”139  It also characterized modern 
state practices as continuing to adhere to the common-law rule, 
stating that the rule had “survived substantially intact . . . in almost all 
 
 128 Id. at 423-24. 
 129 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
 130 Id. at 600-01. 
 131 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 132 Id. at 354. 
 133 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3) (1970) (amended 1988). 
 134 Watson, 423 U.S. at 414-15, 424. 
 135 Id. at 418. 
 136 Id. at 415-22. 
 137 Id. at 422-23. 
 138 Id. at 418. 
 139 Id. at 419-20 (internal citations omitted). 
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of the States in form of express statutory authorization.”140  With the 
Watson Court citing not only state practices and the common law, but 
also federal statutes and a proposed model statute, state practices 
emerged as only a factor in deciding the important Fourth 
Amendment arrest rule. 
By relying on these sources, the Court had to diminish the force 
of its own precedent, which had at times expressed a strong 
preference for warrants.141  The Court’s handling of its precedents 
highlights its deference to the judgments of the states, Congress, and 
the American Law Institute: 
[W]e decline to transform this judicial preference [for a warrant] 
into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and 
Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public 
arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal 
prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence 
of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a 
warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like.142 
Ironically, as the Court invoked the practices of the states to justify its 
reasonableness determination, it nonetheless mentioned a federal 
statute specifically enacted to create “a federal standard independent 
of the vagaries of state laws.”143  Thus, in one section, reliance on state 
practices furthered its determinations, yet in another, reliance on 
state practices undermined federal need for uniformity. 
A concurring opinion by Justice Powell similarly invoked the 
common law and state practices, but admitted what the majority did 
not: its opinion created an “anomaly” by allowing officers to arrest 
without warrants but requiring warrants for many searches.144  Justice 
Powell candidly stated, “[b]ut logic sometimes must defer to history 
and experience.”145  Justice Powell cited the wisdom of state courts, 
legislatures, and “law enforcement agencies” as expressing a need for 
warrantless arrests under these circumstances.146 
 
 140 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1976). 
 141 Id. at 423. 
 142 Id. at 423-24. 
 143 Id. at 421 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3053 (1948), which allowed marshals to make 
warrantless arrests). 
 144 Id. at 427-28 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 145 Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 146 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 430 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“Both the judiciary and the legislative bodies of this Nation repeatedly have placed 
their imprimaturs upon the practice and, as the Government emphasizes, law 
enforcement agencies have developed their investigative and arrest procedures upon 
an assumption that warrantless arrests were valid so long as based on probable 
cause.”). 
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Reliance on these sources for assessing reasonableness 
engendered a strong dissent, one that criticized the Court for not 
using its own “reasoned analysis”147 to decide the constitutionality of a 
police practice.148  It criticized the Court’s use of the common law 
because the common law and current law categorized felonies and 
misdemeanors differently.149  More importantly, the dissent invoked 
Marbury v. Madison.150  It stated, “[t]he Court’s error on this score is 
far more dangerous than its misreading of history, for it is well settled 
that the mere existence of statutes or practice, even of long standing, 
is no defense to an unconstitutional practice.”151 
2. States’ Movement Towards an Arrest Warrant 
Requirement to Enter a Home: Payton v. New York 
Despite the dissent’s strong criticism of Watson’s sources for 
deciding reasonableness, the Court in Payton v. New York152 similarly 
grounded its Fourth Amendment arrest rule, but this time it 
characterized the sources as less clear in deciding reasonableness.  In 
Payton, the Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to strike down 
two New York statutes that allowed police officers to arrest felons in 
their homes without using an arrest warrant.153  In deciding that the 
officers needed an arrest warrant,154 the Court considered the same 
sources as it had in Watson for constructing this arrest rule, yet 
characterized those sources as providing less clarity than they did in 
Watson.  It viewed Watson as considering three sources—the common 
law, state practices, and federal statutes.155 
In examining the common law to characterize what the Framers 
might have intended, the Court stated that the “relevant common law 
 
 147 Id. at 433-34, 442-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 148 Id. at 438 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. at 439-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  The dissent also declared that even if 
the categorizations of felonies and misdemeanors were the same at common law and 
today, the Court would still have an independent duty to balance interests.  Id. at 442 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that “the Court’s unblinking literalism cannot 
replace analysis of the constitutional interests involved”). 
 150 Id. at 443 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I 
Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
 151 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 152 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
 153 Id. at 603. 
 154 The Payton Court specifically left open whether the Fourth Amendment allows 
warrantless entries of suspects’ residences when they have both probable cause and 
exigent circumstances.  Id. at 583.  It noted that the lower courts had not addressed 
the issue of exigent circumstances.  Id. 
 155 Id. at 590. 
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[did] not provide the same guidance that was present in Watson.”156  It 
then diminished the common law’s significance by characterizing it 
as not “definitively settl[ing]” the Fourth Amendment arrest issue.157  
It also undermined the common law’s importance by inconsistently 
characterizing its role in assessing Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness.  For the Payton Court, the common law was not only 
“obviously relevant,” but could also be “entirely dispositive . . . of what 
the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be 
reasonable.”158  By contrast, it also characterized the Fourth 
Amendment as reflecting “contemporary norms and conditions.”159  It 
undercut the force of the common law as a source by stating that it 
had “not simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement 
practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s 
passage.”160 
With the common law providing little guidance, the Payton 
Court considered Watson’s use of state practices in deciding 
reasonableness.161  In Payton, the Court deftly undercut its prior 
consideration of how a majority of states viewed the issue.  The Court 
candidly admitted the majority rule did not harmonize with its 
warrant requirement.  It stated, “[a] majority of the States that have 
taken a position on the question permit warrantless entry into the 
home to arrest even in the absence of exigent circumstances.”162  It 
initially summarized state statutes in this manner: twenty-four 
permitted warrantless entries, fifteen did not, and eleven had not 
decided.163  Despite this majority rule, the Court nonetheless used 
state-court decisions that struck down these state statutes to support a 
different characterization: a current “significant decline during the 
last decade in the number of States permitting warrantless entries for 
arrest.”164  It also recast the majority rule as a minority rule by 
including those states that had not considered the issue.165  It stated, 
“Only 24 of the 50 States currently sanction warrantless entries into 
the home to arrest, . . . and there is an obvious declining trend.”166 
 
 156 Id. at 597. 
 157 Id. at 598. 
 158 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980). 
 159 Id. at 591 n.33. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 598-600. 
 162 Id. at 598. 
 163 Id. at 598-99. 
 164 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 599 (1980). 
 165 See id. at 600. 
 166 Id. 
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The Court also considered state constitutions to support its 
warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.  It noted that 
seven states had interpreted their state constitutions to require 
warrants, and it characterized these interpretations as revealing the 
“depth of the principle.”167  The Court stated, “[t]hat is significant 
because by invoking a state constitutional provision, a state court 
immunizes its decision from review by this Court.”168  The Court used 
these interpretations to emphasize the importance of requiring a 
warrant under the Fourth Amendment.169 
In addition, the Payton Court selectively used state practices to 
construct an evolving Fourth Amendment.170  It viewed the word 
“reasonable” as “amorphous” and stated that “custom and 
contemporary norms necessarily play . . . a large role in the 
constitutional analysis.”171 
In considering the third Watson factor—congressional acts—it 
noted that none had specifically authorized warrantless entries into a 
home.172  And it briefly mentioned a model code provision by the 
American Law Institute that barred such entries only at night.173  The 
majority in Payton neither distinguished nor embraced this model 
code provision. 
The Court’s characterization of each of the Watson factors, 
however, did not match the dissent’s.174  For the dissent, the common 
law clearly did not require an arrest warrant to enter a residence,175 
the states’ “consensus” did not support the Court’s warrant 
requirement,176 and the lack of express federal statutory authorization 
for homes did not negate authorization to arrest without a warrant.177  
With the common law clear from the dissent’s perspective, Congress 
had “intended” that the common-law rule apply.178 
Although the Justices in Payton interpreted differently the 
common law, state practices, and federal practices, they nonetheless 
 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 598-600 
 170 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980). 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 601. 
 173 Id. at 581 n.14. 
 174 Id. at 603-16 (White, J., dissenting). 
 175 Id. at 611, 616 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that “warrantless arrest entries 
were . . . firmly rooted at common law,” and criticizing majority for “ignor[ing] the 
carefully crafted restrictions on the common-law power of arrest entry”). 
 176 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 614 (1980) (White, J., dissenting). 
 177 Id. (White, J., dissenting). 
 178 Id. at 615 (White, J., dissenting). 
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considered them as grounding their Fourth Amendment 
determination.  In crafting these arrest rules, the Court in both 
Payton and Watson cited current state practices as support.  The 
Court’s recent decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista179  reflects a 
similar grounding, one that created a broad arrest rule while noting 
that statutes, not the Fourth Amendment, can better specify limits on 
arrest powers.180 
3. A Majority of States Allowing Arrests for Minor 
Offenses: Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court created an expansive 
Fourth Amendment arrest rule.181  It held that an officer acted 
reasonably within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when 
arresting a driver without a warrant for committing offenses that 
provide only for fines, not for incarceration.182  Even though the 
Court declared that the officer had “(at best) exercis[ed] extremely 
poor judgment,”183 it nonetheless viewed its judicial role as providing 
a broad Fourth Amendment principle.  To justify its reasonableness 
determination, the Court cited the same sources it had used in 
Watson and Payton as well as others: pre-founding practices in English 
common law and statutes and modern state and federal arrest 
statutes.184  In the end, the Court’s decision expressed deep trust in 
state legislatures to craft sound limits on arrest powers. 
By embracing a broad Fourth Amendment arrest power, the 
Court rejected two limiting rules proposed by the arrested driver: 
first, that officers may make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors 
only if they involve a “breach of the peace”;185 and second, that 
officers may not arrest without a warrant “when conviction could not 
ultimately carry any jail time and when the government shows no 
compelling need for immediate detention.”186 
With respect to the first rule, the driver had urged the Court to 
embrace her construction of the common law.  The Court, however, 
 
 179 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 180 Id. at 352 (“It is of course easier to devise a minor-offense limitation by statute 
than to derive one through the Constitution, simply because the statute can let the 
arrest power turn on any sort of practical consideration without having to subsume it 
under a broader principle.”). 
 181 Id. at 354-55. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 346-47. 
 184 Id. at 331-35. 
 185 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327 (2001). 
 186 Id. at 346. 
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disagreed with the suggestion that the common law had a “breach of 
peace” requirement.187  The Court cited pre-founding and founding 
era sources describing the common law,188 declaring that “early 
English statutes” had “riddle[d] . . . [her] supposed common-law rule 
with enough exceptions” to undermine her construction of what the 
Fourth Amendment Framers might have intended.189  In addition, the 
Court characterized early state practices as consistent with its view of 
the common law, noting they too permitted warrantless arrests for 
“nonviolent misdemeanors.”190  The Court stated that even though 
“the Fourth Amendment did not originally apply to the States,”191 
early state practices are not “irrelevant in unearthing the 
Amendment’s original meaning.”192 
The Court also cited the Watson Court’s discussion of federal 
statutes to undercut the first proposed rule.  It noted that early 
Congressional statutes allowed for broad, warrantless arrest powers.193  
It reiterated that the Second Congress had given “‘United States 
marshals the same power as local peace officers’ to make warrantless 
arrests.”194  By viewing early practices as inconsistent with the 
proposed rule, the Atwater Court then looked to modern law.  It 
discerned “two centuries of uninterrupted (and largely 
unchallenged) state and federal practice permitting warrantless 
arrests for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of 
the peace.”195 
In a lengthy appendix, the Court cited arrest statutes from fifty 
states harmonious with its broad arrest principle.196  For the Court, 
the presence of these modern statutes provoked an unusually 
condescending tone: “Small wonder, then, that today statutes in all 50 
States and the District of Columbia permit warrantless misdemeanor 
arrests by at least some (if not all) peace officers without requiring 
any breach of the peace . . . .”197  For the Court, modern statutes 
supported its construction of English and American  common law 
 
 187 Id. at 327. 
 188 Id. at 327-40. 
 189 Id. at 335. 
 190 Id. at 338. 
 191 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 338-39 (2001). 
 192 Id. at 339. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 420 (1976)). 
 195 Id. at 340. 
 196 Id. at 355-60. 
 197 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 344 (2001). 
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that officers may arrest for a misdemeanor committed in their 
presence. 
The Court also considered the driver’s second proposed rule, 
which would have barred arrests for offenses involving only a fine and 
that did not present a “compelling need for immediate detention.”198  
The Court, characterizing the rule as an invitation to create a 
“modern arrest rule”199 limited to the facts of the case, candidly 
admitted that if it were to do so, the arrestee “might well prevail.”200  
The Court instead declared that it would not “mint a new rule of 
constitutional law”201 by balancing interests to determine the 
reasonableness of this particular arrest.  Instead the Court wrote 
expansively about the need to trust states and protect police officers 
from lawsuits.202 
The Court viewed states as acting reasonably in drawing lines for 
authorized arrests.  It cited eight state statutes that had restricted 
“warrantless arrests for minor offenses.”203  The Court broadly defined 
arrest powers permissible under the Fourth Amendment in part 
because it viewed state legislatures as better suited to drafting 
limitations: “It is of course easier to devise a minor-offense limitation 
by statute than to derive one through the Constitution, simply 
because the statute can let the arrest power turn on any sort of 
practical consideration without having to subsume it under a broader 
principle.”204 
It further trusted the states and police officers to arrest only 
when needed because of the financial burdens on limited state 
resources.205  Such self-policing, the Court implied, had already 
occurred because it discerned a “dearth of horribles demanding 
address.”206  It also trusted officers not to conduct arbitrary arrests.207 
The Court also rejected balancing interests because that 
approach would not provide officers with a bright-line rule to 
 
 198 Id. at 346. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 345-46. 
 202 Id. at 351. 
 203 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. (“It is, in fact, only natural that States should resort to this sort of legislative 
regulation . . . [because] it is in the interest of the police to limit petty-offense arrests, 
which carry costs that are simply too great to incur without good reason.”). 
 206 Id. at 353. 
 207 Id. at 353 n.25. 
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administer.208  The Court explained that a bright-line, broad-
categorical rule would safeguard officers’ decisions to arrest when 
they believed that circumstances indicated a need for an arrest.209  A 
more narrow arrest power, the Court contended, would end up 
subjecting officers to too many lawsuits, which would undermine 
their ability to decide whether to arrest an offender.210 The Court 
boldly declared as inadequate the potent affirmative defense of 
qualified immunity,211  which gives officers immunity from suit as well 
as a defense to liability as long as they did not violate “clearly 
established” law.212  The Court did not, however, explain its 
conflicting characterizations of the driver’s proposed balancing 
standard for arrests: on the one hand, a balancing standard would 
not have given officers enough clarity, but on the other hand, it 
would have created clearly established law, forcing them to lose their 
qualified immunity defense.213 
The Court added that the only times officers could face liability 
would be when they conducted arrests in “‘an extraordinary manner, 
unusually harmful to [a person’s] privacy or . . . physical interests.’”214  
While noting that arrests may be “humiliating” as well as 
“inconvenient,” the Court described the driver’s particular arrest as 
not “so extraordinary as to violate the Fourth Amendment.”215 
The Atwater Court thus trusted the states and police officers to 
authorize and conduct reasonable arrests for minor offenses.  The 
Court viewed state legislatures as a better institution for crafting 
limiting rules.  It also viewed states’ limited policing and financial 
resources as a check on this broad arrest discretion.  By refusing to 
balance the privacy and physical interests of particular individuals 
who commit minor offenses against the government’s need to arrest, 
the Court ultimately limited rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
Thus, in assessing whether state arrest rules complied with the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court in Watson, Payton, and Atwater in part 
looked to state practices, sometimes invoking the practices of a 
majority of states and sometimes characterizing the state practices as 
reflecting a particular “trend.”  The Court’s invocation of state 
 
 208 Id. at 354 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)). 
 209 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 350-51 (2001). 
 210 Id. at 350. 
 211 Id. at 351 n.22. 
 212 Id. at 367. 
 213 See id. at 350-51. 
 214 Id. at 354 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)). 
 215 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 355 (2001). 
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practice perhaps suggested that its interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment would not disrupt sound policing practices. 
The Court recently expressed even greater trust in state 
legislatures in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court,216 as it set forth a 
relationship between state law and the Fourth Amendment that 
allows states to expand the scope of a police officer’s authority during 
an investigatory stop.  In affirming its trust in state legislatures, the 
Court this time safeguarded a practice authorized by a minority of 
state legislatures.217 
B. Citing a Minority of State Laws to Justify a Broader Investigatory 
Stop Rule: Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court 
A divided Court in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court218 
authorized states to expand their investigatory powers.  In a fact-
specific holding, the Court determined that a Nevada statute, as 
interpreted by the state’s highest court, did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment when it required an individual to disclose his name to a 
police officer who had reasonable suspicion that the individual had 
engaged in criminal activity.219  In upholding the state statute, the 
Court balanced the government’s interest against the individual’s 
interests220 as it had done in Terry v. Ohio,221 which created a 
reasonable suspicion standard for both forcible investigatory stops 
and pat-downs of suspects.222  More importantly, it accomplished this 
balance with a large thumb on the states’ side of the scale, trusting 
states to have wise policing practices. 
In Hiibel, two state statutes led to a suspect’s conviction for 
resisting a public officer.  One statute imposed on suspects during a 
Terry stop the legal obligation of disclosing their name,223 and the 
 
 216 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459 (2004). 
 217 Id. at 2456. 
 218 Id. at 2459.  Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, declaring a state 
statute valid under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  Id. at 2455-61.  Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the statute 
violated the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 2661-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg dissented, contending that the statute 
violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 2464-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 219 Id. at 2459-60. 
 220 Id. at 2459. 
 221 392 U.S. 1, 24-27 (1968). 
 222 For a discussion of Terry, see infra text accompanying notes 235-37 & 243-45. 
 223 NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003).  The statute provides as follows: 
1.  Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer 
encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the 
person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. 
 . . . . 
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other statute criminalized “willfully resist[ing], delay[ing] or 
obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or attempting to 
discharge any legal duty of his office.”224  When Larry Hiibel refused 
to reveal his name to an officer who had reasonable suspicion that 
Hiibel had committed an assault, he was charged with and convicted 
of resisting a public officer, a misdemeanor.225  Mr. Hiibel challenged 
his conviction, alleging that the state’s identification requirement 
violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments226 to the United 
States Constitution.227  The Court upheld his conviction,228 and it 
dramatically deferred to state police power in its interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
When interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Court had to 
confront dicta from numerous decisions suggesting that a suspect 
may remain silent without penalty during an investigatory stop.229  
 
3.  The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to 
ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his 
presence abroad.  Any person so detained shall identify himself, but 
may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer. 
4.  A person may not be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to 
effect the purposes of this section, and in no event longer than 60 
minutes. 
Id. 
 224 NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2003).  Under the statute, individuals commit a 
felony if they also use a weapon to resist, obstruct, or delay; otherwise, such conduct 
would constitute a misdemeanor: 
A person who in any case or under any circumstances not otherwise 
specially provided for, willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public 
officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his 
office shall be punished: 
1. Where a dangerous weapon is used in the course of such 
resistance, obstruction, or delay, for a category D felony . . . . 
2. Where no dangerous weapon is used in the course of such 
resistance, obstruction or delay, for a misdemeanor. 
Id. 
 225 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455-56.  The officer also arrested Mr. Hiibel for domestic 
battery, but the state dismissed this charge prior to trial.  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. 
Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 n.1 (Nev. 2002), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 226 The Court’s analysis of the Fifth Amendment falls outside the scope of this 
Article. 
 227 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. 
 228 Id. at 2460-61.  For his misdemeanor conviction, Hiibel received a fine of $250 
and incurred a $70 administrative fee.  Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 4, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 540 U.S. 965 (2003) (No. 03-
5554). 
 229 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458-59.  In Hiibel, eight justices acknowledged dicta in 
opinions indicating that a suspect during an investigatory stop may remain silent.  
The majority opinion dismissed language in two decisions, and three dissenting 
justices cited four decisions.  The majority referred to Justice White’s concurring 
opinion in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring), and Berkemer v. 
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The Court surprisingly characterized these dicta as consistent with 
suspects’ obligation to disclose their names.  It did so by assigning 
different roles to the Fourth Amendment and to state law.  The Court 
explained that “the Fourth Amendment does not impose obligations 
on the citizen but instead provides rights against the government.  As 
a result, the Fourth Amendment itself cannot require a suspect to 
answer questions.”230  For the Court, “the source of the legal 
obligation” was “Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment.”231 
The Court’s dichotomy, at some level, resembled classic roles for 
the Fourth Amendment and state law with respect to a state’s power 
to define substantive crimes,232 to grant arrest powers,233 and to select 
appropriate penalties.  Yet the Court gave the Fourth Amendment a 
limited role in this context.  The Court’s discussion ultimately 
reflected deep trust in state legislatures, even though it did purport 
to subject the mandatory identification statute to Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny. 
While addressing the Fourth Amendment standard for 
investigatory stops, the Court revisited the balancing model it had 
used in Terry v. Ohio,234 which broke new ground in 1968 by 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment to have a reasonable suspicion 
standard for investigatory stops and frisks.235  Under Terry, the Fourth 
Amendment permits officers to forcibly stop individuals when they 
have reasonable suspicion to believe that “criminal activity may be 
afoot.”  The Terry Court also declared that officers may “conduct a 
carefully limited search of the [suspect’s] outer clothing” if the 
 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).  Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.  The dissent cited 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) and Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000), in addition to Terry and Berkemer.  Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. 
at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 230 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 231 Id. 
 232 See, e.g., Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436 (“Under the law of most States, it is a crime 
either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having stopped, to 
drive away without permission.”). 
 233 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 337 (2001) (“During the 
period leading up to and surrounding the framing of the Bill of Rights, colonial and 
state legislatures, like Parliament before them, regularly authorized local peace 
officers to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests without conditioning statutory 
authority on breach of the peace.”) (internal citations omitted); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 
437 n.26 (“State laws governing when a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop 
may or must be issued a citation instead of taken into custody vary significantly, but 
no State requires that a detained motorist be arrested unless he is accused of a 
specified serious crime, refuses to promise to appear in court, or demands to be 
taken before a magistrate.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 234 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 235 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458-61. 
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officers have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is “armed and 
presently dangerous.”236  The Terry Court derived this standard by 
balancing the government’s need for investigatory stops against an 
individual’s “inestimable right of personal security.”237 
Nevertheless, when the Hiibel Court applied this balancing 
standard, it did not characterize an individual’s interest in 
maintaining silence, other than nominally noting that the demand 
for identification did not lengthen the stop, nor change “its 
location.”238  The Court did, however, describe the government’s 
interest in knowing a suspect’s name as an “important government” 
interest.239  In giving weight to the government’s side of the scale, the 
Court was concerned that a suspect may have a “record of violence or 
mental disorder.”240  In the area of domestic assault cases, the Court 
listed specific concerns of officer safety and “possible danger to the 
potential victim.”241  The Court also declared that “identity may 
inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense.”242 
The Hiibel Court also invoked the two-part inquiry in Terry that 
framed its balancing of interests: a police officer’s actions “must be 
‘“justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”‘“243  
For the Court, the officer’s demand for identification furthered the 
legitimate purposes of the investigatory stop because the officer had 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as opposed to a forcible stop 
without such suspicion.244  The Court concluded that the balancing 
“principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his 
name in the course of a Terry stop.”245  In short, the Fourth 
Amendment did not require disclosure; it only permitted a state law 
to authorize mere disclosure. 
Although the Hiibel Court considered the constitutionality of the 
Nevada statute, it also cited other “stop and identify” statutes enacted 
 
 236 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 237 Id. at 8-9. 
 238 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 239 Id. at 2458. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id.  Ironically, in discussing the Fifth Amendment, the Court declared that 
identity disclosure was not “incriminating,” except in “unusual circumstances.”  Id. at 
2461.  The Court expressly deferred to the “Nevada Legislature’s judgment . . . that 
the disclosure would [not] tend to incriminate [a suspect].”  Id. 
 243 Id. at 2458 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20)) (alteration in original). 
 244 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2460 (2004). 
 245 Id. at 2459. 
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in a minority of states.246  It characterized these statutes as combining 
“vagrancy laws” with the limits created by Terry.247  By citing these 
statutes, the Court needed to address decisions that had struck down 
vagrancy laws as void for vagueness,248 even though the suspect did 
not raise this issue in Hiibel.249  The Court quickly distinguished its 
present case by noting that unlike prior decisions, this case involved a 
statute that required police officers to have reasonable suspicion for a 
forcible stop, and it saw the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion as 
clearly interpreting the statute’s requirements.250  The Court quoted 
the lower court opinion, which interpreted the statute to require a 
suspect to “state his name to an officer.”251  The Hiibel Court added its 
own nuance to the lower court’s construction when it assumed that 
the statute did not require a suspect to have a “driver’s license or any 
other document.”252 
As the Court examined state statutes in twenty states, it referred 
to similarities and differences.  It broadly described the similarities: 
“all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his 
identity.”253  As it discussed the differences, it briefly noted their 
historical sources, such as the Uniform Arrest Act and the Model 
Penal Code.254  It also described variations in the legal significance 
given to a defendant’s failure to provide identification: some states 
made nondisclosure a misdemeanor, some a “civil violation,” and 
others used it as a “factor” in ascertaining whether a person was 
 
 246 Id. at 2456. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at 2457.  The Court referred to the statute in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 
(1979), which violated the Fourth Amendment because the stop did not involve 
reasonable suspicion as required by Terry.  Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457.  The Court also 
mentioned Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 (1983), which declared a California 
statute facially void for vagueness because requiring a suspect to produce “credible 
and reliable” identification did not provide a sufficiently clear standard for 
compliance.  Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (2002)). 
 252 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457.  The Nevada Supreme Court never mentioned “a 
driver’s license or any other document for identification.” See Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1206.  
When officers have probable cause for a vehicle violation, some states have afforded 
officers discretion in deciding what constitutes sufficient documentation.  See, e.g., 
People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 72  (Cal. 2002) (upholding officer’s discretion to arrest 
person who had been riding his bicycle in the wrong direction, even though he 
disclosed his name and birth date, because he failed to comply with California statute 
requiring person to provide “a driver’s license or other satisfactory evidence of his 
identity for examination” (citing CA. VEH. CODE § 40302(a) (West 2000))). 
 253 Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. 
 254 Id. 
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loitering.255  With respect to other states, the Court, without any 
citation to specific statutes or cases, tersely stated, “a suspect may 
decline to identify himself without penalty.”256 
The cited statutes, however, imposed greater disclosure 
requirements than did the specific holding in Hiibel.  For example, 
some statutes stated that an officer may “demand” or require a 
person during an investigatory stop to provide an address,257 to 
explain conduct,258 to give “identification if available,”259 or to state 
business abroad and destination.260  The statutes that referred to 
loitering arguably raised classic void for vagueness problems, such as 
a statute criminalizing the actions of a person who “[l]ingers, remains 
or prowls in a public place or the premises of another without 
apparent reason and under circumstances that warrant alarm or 
concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity . . . .”261  
The loitering statutes characterized as a suspicious circumstance a  
suspect’s refusal to identify himself as well as failure to give a 
“reasonably credible account of his presence and purpose.”262  One of 
the cited loitering statutes provided that “[f]ailure to identify or 
account for oneself, absent other circumstances, however, shall not 
 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103(1) 
(2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902(a) (2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 
(2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1) (2003); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
215.1(A) (2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 84.710(2) (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 
(2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW  § 140.50(1) 
(McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 
(2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 968.24 (2003), cited in Hiibel, 
124 S. Ct. at 2456. 
 258 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103(1); 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/107-14; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
215.1(A); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 29-29-21; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15; WIS. STAT. § 968.24, cited in Hiibel, 124 S. 
Ct. at 2456. 
 259 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103(1), cited in Hiibel, 124 C. Ct. at 2456. 
 260 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902(a); MO. REV. STAT. § 84.710(2); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 594:2; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1, cited in Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. 
 261 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1), cited in Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. The Court 
cited four other loitering or prowling statutes, all similar to the Arkansas statute: DEL. 
CODE ANN.  tit. 11, § 1321(6) (2003); FLA. STAT. § 856.021(2) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-11-36(b) (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:6 (2003).  Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456.  
These statutes also provided a defense when an officer failed to give a suspect the 
opportunity to speak.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-71-213(d) (“It shall be a defense 
to prosecution under . . .  this section that the law enforcement officer did not afford 
the defendant an opportunity to identify himself and explain his presence and 
conduct . . . .”). 
 262 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1), cited in Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. 
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be grounds for arrest.”263  In addition, one state statute focused on the 
“petty misdemeanor” of concealed identity.  “Concealing identity 
consists of concealing one’s true name or identity . . . with intent to 
intimidate, hinder, or interrupt any public officer .  .  .  in a legal 
performance of his duty . . . .”264  By contrast, one state statute 
indicated an officer “may request” a driver’s name and address, an 
explanation of conduct, as well as a “driver’s license and the vehicle’s 
registration and proof of insurance.”265  In the end, only a few statutes 
may be constitutional, under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, if the Court were to later refuse to extend Hiibel’s 
reasoning to other contexts.266 
The Court did not canvas the “stop and identify” statutes from 
all states, but instead cited statutes listed in an amicus brief267 that 
contended that the Nevada identification statute violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  Although the omitted statutes both barred268 and 
 
 263 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:6, cited in Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. 
 264 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-3 (2004), cited in Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456.  The New 
Mexico Court of Appeals has interpreted this statute as requiring more than 
disclosure of one’s name during a lawful traffic stop, an event for which an officer 
has probable cause as opposed to just reasonable suspicion.  State v. Andrews, 934 
P.2d 289, 293 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).  The Andrews decision specifically left open 
“other situations.”  Id.  The decision, however, also contains broad statutory 
interpretative language: 
 Identity is not limited to name alone.  The use of the disjunctive 
word “or” indicates that failing to give either name or identity may 
violate the statute.  There would be no reason for the legislature to 
include the word “identity” if it carried the same meaning as “name.” 
 . . . Given the language of the statute, we hold that [the speeding 
driver] was prohibited from concealing information pertaining to his 
“identity,” which in this case necessarily includes more than just a 
correct name. 
Id. at 291 (citations omitted).  See also State v. Dawson, 983 P.2d 421, 423, 426 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1999) (upholding conviction under the same statute when detainee delayed 
in revealing his name when officer had reasonable suspicion or “even probable 
cause” due to missing license plate on motor vehicle driven by detainee, and stating 
that “[o]ne could infer that concealment for any period of time, however short, 
violates the statute”). 
 265 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (2003), cited in Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. 
 266 Although Justice Breyer in his dissent did not refer to these broader statutes, 
he nonetheless questioned whether the Court would later permit states to grant 
officers the authority to compel responses to other questions. 124 S. Ct. at 2465-66 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer specifically referred to compelled disclosure of 
a “license number” and address and wondered whether an officer can “keep track of 
the constitutional answers.” Id. 
 267 Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner app., 
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554), 2003 WL 
22970845. 
 268 GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 30.20 (2003).  Guam’s  investigatory stop statute states 
that a “person shall not be compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer.”  Id. 
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allowed compelled disclosure of identity,269 the Court never referred 
to similar ordinances,270 despite their inclusion in the amicus brief.271  
By granting states the authority to decide whether to create this “legal 
obligation” to disclose, the Court thus failed to address the lack of 
uniformity that will now exist between states and their 
municipalities.272 
 
 269 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 2003).  After the United States 
Supreme Court declared an older California loitering statute facially 
unconstitutionally vague in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983), the 
California legislature did not repeal the statute, but did adopt gender neutral 
language and changed  “such” to “this”: 
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of 
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: 
. . . . 
Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify 
himself or herself and to account for his or her presence when 
requested by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding 
circumstances would indicate to a reasonable person that the public 
safety demands this identification. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e).  The Court also did not cite two statutes from Guam, one 
which addressed investigatory stops and the other the offense of loitering.  GUAM 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 30.10 (2003) (investigatory stops); GUAM CODE ANN., tit. 9, § 61.30 
(2003) (a loitering statute that makes refusal “to identify” oneself a circumstance for 
an officer to consider when deciding whether loitering has occurred, provided that 
the officer gave the suspect an opportunity to “identify himself and explain his 
presence and conduct”).  A loitering statute from the Virgin Islands also imposed an 
identification duty.  V.I.  CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1191(1) (2003) (punishing an 
individual who “loiters, remains or wanders in or about a place without apparent 
reason and under circumstances which reasonably justify suspicion that he may be 
engaged or about to engage in crime, and, upon inquiring by a police officer, refuses 
to identify himself or fails to give a reasonably credible account of his conduct and 
purpose”). 
 270 See, e.g., Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner 
app., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554), 2003 
WL 22970845 (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-84-310 (2003) (during certain 
investigatory stops, officer “may demand the name and address of [a suspect] and an 
explanation of his actions”); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE § 225.11 (2003) (during 
investigatory stops for felonies or an “offense involving the use of a weapon of any 
kind, [an officer] may demand of [the suspect] his name, address, and an 
explanation of his actions”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 84.710 (West 2003) (during 
investigatory stops, an officer may “demand” a suspect’s “name, address, business 
abroad and whither he is going”); ARLINGTON, VA., CODE § 17-13 (2003) (officer may 
in a public place demand a suspect’s identification to further public safety, 
depending on “surrounding circumstances”). 
 271 Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner app, 
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004) (No. 03-5554), 2003 WL 
22970845. 
 272 An amicus brief urged the Court to strike down the Nevada statute, citing “the 
cumulative effect that the patchwork of state, county, and local ordinances will have 
upon the right to remain silent.”  Id. at 16.  The brief described a new burden that 
lawyers face after Hiibel: “Justice Robert Jackson once remarked that ‘[a]ny lawyer 
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Ironically, this lack of uniformity may be short lived if states 
currently lacking a stop and identify statute enact one for 
investigatory stops or amend other related statutes.273  States may also 
choose to interpret their obstruction statutes to incorporate Hiibel’s 
“legal obligation.”  Before Hiibel, some states interpreted their 
obstruction statutes to require disclosure of one’s name during an 
investigatory stop,274 some states had refused to do so,275 others had 
 
worth his salt will tell suspects in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police 
under any circumstances.’  If the Nevada statute (and others like it) are sustained, 
such advice will no longer be sound.”  Id. (citation omitted).  See also Risbridger v. 
Connelly, 275 F.3d 565, 569 n.3 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting the difference between 
Michigan’s obstruction statute and East Lansing’s obstruction ordinance: the statute 
“proscribe[s] only actual or threatened physical interference with an officer,” but the 
ordinance “makes it unlawful to assault, obstruct, resist, hinder or oppose an officer, 
[and] does not as whole imply that physical interference is required to establish a 
violation”). 
 273 See, e.g., Adams v. Praytor, No. Civ.A.303CV0002N, 2004 WL 1490021, at *4 n.1 
(N.D. Tex. July 1, 2004).  In Adams, a federal district court both cited Hiibel and 
noted that Texas’ failure-to-identify statute only applied to individuals already 
arrested: “Hiibel addresses the topic of what the Constitution permits, not what Texas 
statutes make unlawful.  Here, the Texas Penal Code did not make [the individual’s] 
failure to identify himself unlawful” when the officer arrested him for failing to 
identify himself.  Id. at *6 n.2 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02 (Vernon 2003).  
Under the Texas identification statute, a state may prosecute the failure to disclose 
one’s “name, residence address, or date of birth” after officers “lawfully arrest the 
person and request the information.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a). 
 274 See, e.g., Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2000).  In Oliver, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a suspect’s 
conviction under Utah’s obstruction statute and noted that the Utah identification 
statute (later cited by the Hiibel Court, 124 S. Ct. at 2456 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-7-15 (2003)) did not provide for any “criminal sanctions.”  Oliver, 209 F.3d at 1188 
n.8.  Instead of using Utah’s identification statute to create a “legal obligation” to 
disclose one’s name during an investigatory stop, the Tenth Circuit relied only on the 
obstruction statute.  Id. at 1188-89 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305).  The Utah 
obstruction statute provided in part as follows: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or  by 
the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace 
officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or 
another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
. . . . 
(3) the arrested person’s or another person’s refusal to refrain 
from performing any act that would impede the arrest or 
detention. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (2004) (emphasis added).  The Oliver Court interpreted 
Utah’s obstruction statute to apply to the lawful detention of an investigatory stop 
and a suspect’s refusal to identify himself.  209 F.3d at 1189. 
By considering New Mexico’s concealed identity statute, the Tenth Circuit has also 
upheld a conviction for a suspect’s refusal to disclose his name during an 
investigatory stop.  Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d  1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-3, which criminalizes the concealing of one’s 
identity “with intent to obstruct the due execution of the law or with intent to 
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intimidate, hinder or interrupt any public officer or any other person in a legal 
performance of his duty”). 
Similarly, a federal district court, without using a state identification statute, stated 
that Georgia’s obstruction statute would support a conviction for obstruction when a 
person refuses “to provide identification” during an investigatory stop.  Gainor v. 
Douglas County, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1282 (N.D. Ga. 1998). 
 275 See, e.g., Praytor, 2004 WL 14900021, at *4 n.1 (stating that the Texas statute 
prohibiting interfering with a peace officer’s duties has an explicit exception for 
failing to identify: “‘It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the 
interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of speech 
only’” (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(d) (Vernon 2003)); State v. 
Woodring, Nos. 96-0831-CR, 96-0834-CR, 96-0832-CR, 96-0833-CR, 1996 WL 653703, 
at *1-2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1996) (stating that the obstruction statute does not 
apply even when officers have probable cause to believe that a person trepassed and 
refused to provide identification, and citing Wisconsin jury instruction on 
obstruction; also noting that “[f]urther expansion to cover simple refusal to answer 
questions should be done, if done at all, only by direct and carefully focused 
legislative action” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Henes v. Morrissey, 533 
N.W.2d 802, 807-08 (Wis. 1995) (even though state identification statute indicated 
that an officer may “demand” suspect’s name, interpreting state obstruction statute 
to bar officers from elevating “reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] committed the 
car theft to probable cause that he obstructed their investigation” simply because the 
suspect refused to identify himself (citing WIS. STAT. § 968.24 (identification statute 
cited in Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456) and WIS. STAT. § 946.41 (“resisting or obstructing 
officer” statute))).  The Henes Court further noted that the suspect had not given 
false information, had not fled when seeing the officers, nor acted violently; the 
suspect had simply remained silent when asked for identification.  Henes, 533 N.W.2d 
at 808.  See also United States v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating 
that suspects’ “refusal to furnish identification—which they were entitled to do if 
indeed this was a Terry stop . . . may have created suspicion that they had actually 
used false names, but falls far short of probable cause” to believe that they violated 
Georgia’s false name statute, and noting that suspects had responded to officers’ 
request to see their airline tickets, which contained the false names used to identify 
themselves). 
In contrast to decisions construing state statutes to strike down convictions 
arising from a suspect’s refusal to identify, some courts interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment to bar such convictions.  After Hiibel, these decisions do not necessarily 
resolve the question whether a particular state statute created the “legal obligation” 
to disclose as permitted in Hiibel.  For example, before Hiibel, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals examined the two Nevada statutes at issue in Hiibel, declaring that they 
could not support a conviction for obstruction as applied to the facts of the case 
because they violated the Fourth Amendment.  Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 
279 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2002).  Because Hiibel specifically declared that the 
Nevada identification statute comported with the Fourth Amendment, 124 S. Ct. at 
2459, Carey no longer has vitality.  Other decisions decided on Fourth Amendment 
grounds will still require inquiry as to whether a particular state statute created a 
“legal obligation” to disclose.  See, e.g., Martinelli v. City of Beaumont, 820 F.2d 1491, 
1494 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that jury instruction stating that person could be 
prosecuted under California obstruction statute for refusal to identify oneself during 
an investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment). 
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compelled disclosure under certain circumstances,276 and others had 
left the question open.277  Because obstruction and similar statutes 
currently exist in all states, Hiibel will dramatically impact state 
authority in states that interpret their statutes to include a legal duty 
to disclose one’s name.278 
In trusting the states to create appropriate legal obligations, the 
Court did not mention how individuals will know when they have a 
Fourth Amendment right to be silent during an “encounter” as 
opposed to an investigatory stop.279  Under the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, no state statute could compel and punish 
 
 276 See, e.g., State v. Srnsky, 582 S.E.2d 859, 868 (W. Va. 2003) (“[T]he charge of 
obstructing an officer may be substantiated when a citizen does not supply 
identification when required by express statutory direction or when the refusal 
occurs after a law enforcement officer has communicated the reason why the 
citizen’s name is being sought in relation to the officer’s official duties.”)  The court 
in Srnsky also noted that “motorists are statutorily required as a condition of using 
public roadways to comply with orders of law enforcement officers.”  Id. n.15 (citing 
W. VA. CODE ANN.  § 17C-2-3). 
 277 See, e.g., Shepard v. Ripperger, No. 02-1939, 2003 WL 192101, at *2 (8th Cir. 
Jan. 19, 2003) (granting officers qualified immunity because law was not “clearly 
established about whether refusing to identify oneself [during an investigatory stop] 
provides probable cause for arrest” under the Iowa statute barring interfering with 
official acts). 
 278 But see People v. Brito, No. 200NY013984, 2004 WL 1488404, at *1 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. June 22, 2004).  In Brito, a New York state court interpreted its obstruction statute 
to apply to individuals “committing felonies or misdemeanors, and not traffic 
infractions.”  Id. at *2.  Yet, when the passenger, who had not worn her seatbelt, 
refused to identify herself, the court upheld the officer’s authority to arrest her for 
the seatbelt violation.  Id. (citing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)). 
 279 See, e.g., Holt v. State, 487 S.E.2d 629, 632-33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).  In Holt, the 
Georgia Court of Appeals held that, under the state’s false identity statute, because 
an officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he could not lawfully 
arrest a passenger in a lawfully stopped car for giving him a false name and birth 
date.  Id.  By contrast, the dissent viewed the facts as raising reasonable suspicion, 
viewing the arrest as valid under the state statute.  Id. at 635 (Smith, J., dissenting).  
See also Iowa v. Hauan, 361 N.W.2d 336, 340-41 (Iowa 1984).  In Hauan, officers 
executed a search warrant at a private club and restaurant, looking for evidence of 
illegal liquor sales and prostitution.  Id. at 337-38.  The officers informed the patrons 
of their investigation and asked their names.  Id.  Officers arrested a patron who 
refused to disclose his identity, contending that he violated a state statute 
criminalizing interfering with official acts.  Id. at 338.  The Iowa Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction, relying on dicta in both Terry and Berkemer, id. at 340, which 
were characterized by the Hiibel majority as describing only the Fourth Amendment, 
not legal obligations imposed by a state statute.  See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459; supra 
note 230 and accompanying text. Because the officers lacked  reasonable suspicion, 
the Iowa court upheld the patron’s right to remain silent: “This is not a country 
where an individual must present his or her green card and proper papers at the 
whim of a law officer, or face jail.”  Hauan, 361 N.W.2d at 341.  Ironically, the dissent 
invoked Terry, stating that officers had reason to believe that a patron may be a 
witness or “a possible defendant,” one that does not need to know the “nature of the 
investigation.” Id.  (Donielson, J., dissenting). 
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individuals for failing to disclose their names when an officer lacks 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.280  Making a request in this 
context would constitute a consensual encounter.281  Yet, if the officer 
has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and forcibly stops an 
individual, then the detainee’s refusal to disclose his name—if a state 
statute or ordinance creates a legal obligation—might constitute 
obstruction.  In short, the Court’s decision allows police officers who 
have reasonable suspicion of one criminal offense to convert 
reasonable suspicion into probable cause for another offense—
obstruction.  Yet, a citizen typically does not know what information 
police officers possess during a stop. 
The Court thus trusted states (and impliedly municipalities) to 
decide whether to create the legal obligation to disclose one’s 
identity to an officer during an investigatory stop.  Yet, almost two 
decades prior to Hiibel, in Tennessee v. Garner,282 the Court only 
rhetorically deferred to state practices while it more sharply limited 
states’ authority to use deadly force in seizing suspects. 
C. Constructing a “Trend” in State Practices to Limit Deadly Seizures: 
Tennessee v. Garner 
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court also invoked modern state 
police practices in determining the reasonableness of using deadly 
force to seize suspects.283  In doing so, the Court carefully framed the 
practices of states to suggest that they supported the Court’s new 
standard: 
[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is 
probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving 
the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, 
deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, 
where feasible, some warning has been given.284 
The Court also justified its standard by citing the deadly-force policies 
from the “majority of large cities.”285  Additionally, the Court used 
 
 280 See, e.g., Srnsky, 582 S.E.2d at 868 (holding “that refusal to identify oneself to a 
law enforcement officer does not, standing alone, form the basis for a charge of 
obstructing a law enforcement officer in performing official duties”). 
 281 See, e.g., State v. Smith, No. 03-1062, 2004 WL 1336301, at *4 (Iowa June 16, 
2004) (stating that after officer completed traffic citation against driver, his request 
of a passenger to provide identification occurred during a consensual encounter, 
which led to discovery of an outstanding warrant and passenger’s possession of illegal 
drugs). 
 282 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 283 Id. at 15-20. 
 284 Id. at 11. 
 285 Id. at 18. 
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state and municipal practices to aid in balancing interests.286  For the 
Court, the government’s self-imposed limit on the use of deadly force 
tipped the balance towards safeguarding an individual’s 
“fundamental interest in his own life.”287 
The Garner Court examined a Tennessee statute, which provided 
that “[if], after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he 
either flees or forcibly resists, the officer may use all the necessary 
means to effect the arrest.”288  The Court noted that the Tennessee 
Supreme Court had interpreted the statute to prohibit officers from 
using deadly force to arrest misdemeanants.289  When evaluating the 
constitutionality of the Tennessee statute, the Court noted that it 
reflected the common-law rule, which permitted officers to use 
deadly force to seize fleeing felons.290 
The tragic facts of Garner aided the Court in striking down the 
Tennessee statute as applied to these circumstances.  While 
investigating a nighttime burglary of a residence, a police officer 
heard the house door slam and watched a person run across the 
backyard, stopping at a six-foot-high fence.291  Using a flashlight, the 
officer saw a youth’s “face and hands” and “figured that [the suspect] 
was unarmed.”292  The officer shouted “police, halt!”293  When Garner 
began climbing the fence, the officer shot him in the head.294  The 
fifteen-year-old Garner later died.295  The officer’s shooting complied 
with both the Tennessee statute296 and the common-law rule.297 
The Court declared that this deadly seizure violated the Fourth 
Amendment by explicitly rejecting the common-law rule298 as well as 
early state practices.299  The Court admitted that it had previously 
 
 286 Id. at 19-20 
 287 Id. at 9. 
 288 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1985) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 
(1982)). 
 289 Id. at 5 n.5 (citing Johnson v. State, 114 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. 1938)). 
 290 Id. at 12. 
 291 Id. at 3. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. at 4. 
 294 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4 (1985). 
 295 Id. at 4 nn.2 & 3. 
 296 Id. at 4. 
 297 Id. at 12. 
 298 Id. (admitting that it had “often looked to the common law in evaluating” 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness). 
 299 Id. (noting that “[m]ost American jurisdictions also imposed a flat prohibition 
against the use of deadly force to stop a fleeing misdemeanant, coupled with a 
general privilege to use such force to stop a fleeing felon”). 
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used both the common law and early state practices to evaluate law 
enforcement procedures under the Fourth Amendment.300  The 
Court characterized these older practices as conflicting with modern 
police practices, which are more protective of a suspect’s interest in 
life.301  The Court seemed to justify scrutiny of modern practices on 
three grounds.  First, modern practices informed the Court as to how 
to assess the gravity of the states’ interests in seizing suspects.302  
Second, modern practices revealed a dramatic reclassification from 
the common law as to what currently constitutes a misdemeanor or a 
felony.303  Finally, they revealed a “sweeping change” in technology.304 
To describe modern police practices, the Court canvassed all 
states, but in doing so, it carefully skewed the data to support its 
holding.305  It listed twenty-three states as having the common-law 
rule,306 twenty-two as not using the common-law rule,307 and four states 
with unclear positions.308  The Court admitted that “[i]t cannot be 
said that there is a constant or overwhelming trend away from the 
common-law rule.”309  Despite this admission, the Court summarized 
state practices by declaring that the common-law practice “remains 
the rule in less than half the States.”310  In short, the four undeclared 
states, which might have, through time, ultimately adopted the 
common- law rule, did not count.  Instead the Court made this 
statement, knowing that the states had split on the issue, with twenty-
three in favor of and twenty-two against the common-law practice. 
To bolster its analysis of modern state police practices, the Court 
also cited a number of other sources: deadly force policies in “large 
cities;”311 the policy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;312 the 
association that accredits police departments;313 and, most 
importantly, the Model Penal Code, which the Court ultimately 
adopted as the Fourth Amendment standard for the use of deadly 
 
 300 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1985). 
 301 Id. at 15-19. 
 302 Id. at 19. 
 303 Id. at 14. 
 304 Id. at 13-15 (noting that “[t]he common-law rule developed at a time when 
weapons were rudimentary”). 
 305 Id. at 15-18. 
 306 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 16-17 & nn. 15 & 16 (1985). 
 307 Id. at 16-17 & nn.17-19. 
 308 Id. at 17 & n.20. 
 309 Id. at 18. 
 310 Id. (emphasis added). 
 311 Id. at 18-19. 
 312 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 18, 21 (1985). 
 313 Id. at 18. 
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force, a construction explicitly adopted by two states and similar to 
statutes in eighteen others.314  In addition, the Court cited research 
indicating that “only 7.5% of departmental and municipal policies 
explicitly permit the use of deadly force against any felon. . . [while] 
86.8% explicitly do not.”315  After listing and characterizing state and 
municipal practices, the Court used them to shape its assessment of 
the Fourth Amendment standard: “In light of the rules adopted by 
those who must actually administer them, the older and fading 
common-law view is a dubious indicium of the constitutionality of the 
Tennessee statute . . . .”316 
The Court also explained that modern police practices aided 
balancing interests, a task necessarily implied by the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard.317  The majority acknowledged 
the importance of providing officers with the law enforcement tools 
they need: “We would hesitate to declare a police practice of long 
standing unreasonable if doing so would severely hamper effective 
law enforcement.”318  Nonetheless, the Court characterized the 
government’s interests as less weighty as a result of the self-imposed 
limitations of states and cities.319  By doing so, the Court candidly 
admitted that it assumed that some suspects would elude capture.320  
The Court tersely stated, “[i]t is not better that all felony suspects die 
than that they escape.”321 
The Court also justified rejecting the common-law rule by 
looking to other current practices, specifically, the changes in offense 
classifications and the weapons police officers now carry in aid of 
their duties.322  The common-law rule assumed that felons needed 
immediate capture, which would have involved “hand-to-hand” 
struggles.323  The assumption of danger, according to the Court, did 
not relate to either the modern offense classifications or to the 
weapons officers may currently use.324  The Court compared the 
 
 314 Id. at 16-17.  The court of appeals in Garner had declared that the Model Penal 
Code “accurately state[d] Fourth Amendment limitations on the use of deadly force 
against fleeing felons.”  Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t., 710 F.2d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 
1983) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)). 
 315 Garner, 471 U.S. at 19 (citations omitted). 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Id. at 11. 
 321 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
 322 Id. at 14-15. 
 323 Id. at 14. 
 324 Id. at 14-15. 
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“physical threat” present in the misdemeanor of driving while 
intoxicated to the danger arising from white-collar felonies.325  In 
addition, the Court noted that officers did not begin using 
“handguns . . . until the latter half of the [nineteenth] century.”326  As 
a result, the common-law rule, if applied to today, would result in 
increased physical harm to suspects.327 
The Garner Court thus attempted to justify its balance of interests 
by relying on current policing practices.  In the dissent’s view, the 
Court not only failed to assess the dangerousness of a nighttime 
burglary of a home, but it also departed from the common-law rule, 
still in place “in nearly half of the States.”328  More dramatically, the 
dissent questioned the majority’s interest in state practices: “But it 
should go without saying that the effectiveness or popularity of a 
particular police practice does not determine its constitutionality.”329  
The dissent cited an Eighth Amendment case addressing a state’s 
structuring of the death penalty process: “The Eighth Amendment is 
not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a 
majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws.”330  
Yet, the dissent invoked current state practices when declaring that 
the Court should not require states to provide social science research 
in support of its practice, particularly when the practice “continues to 
be accepted by a substantial number of the States.”331  In addition, the 
dissent failed to mention that its cited Eighth Amendment case, 
which extensively canvassed state practices, nonetheless recognized 
an independent federal duty to assess constitutionality.332 
IV. CONCLUSION: INTERWEAVING RESPECT FOR STATES WITH THE 
NEED FOR A FEDERAL INDEPENDENT CHECK ON ABUSIVE PRACTICES 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
manifests a peculiar interest in deferring to modern state search and 
seizure laws when determining what constitutes a reasonable police 
 
 325 Id. at 14 n.12. 
 326 Id. at 15. 
 327 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15 (1985). 
 328 Id. at 23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 329 Id. at 28 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 330 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 331 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 332 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464 (stating that “[a]lthough the judgments of 
legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately 
to judge whether the Eighth Amendment is violated by a challenged practice”) 
(citations omitted). 
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practice.  Under this idea of “federalism,” the Court has viewed 
current state laws as a source for defining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.  This interweaving of state practices with federal 
protections raises important federalism questions, particularly when 
the context involves criminal law enforcement.  State legislators 
during their election campaigns have often promised to strongly 
support law enforcement agendas, with little interest in promising to 
repeal criminal laws that infringe current values.  In addition, state 
court judges today may similarly campaign to preserve law 
enforcement powers in light of the United States Supreme Court’s 
recent acknowledgment of its new discretion in addressing 
controversial issues.  As a result, the Court’s deference to state search 
and seizure practices may fail to safeguard a politically unpopular 
group—alleged criminals.  In the end, the Court’s view of 
contemporary state practices resembles the horizontal federalism 
practiced by sovereign state courts, when they look to other state 
constitutions as a guide when interpreting their own constitutions.  
Both the United States Supreme Court and state courts ultimately 
view the practices of a distinct sovereign as an aid in giving meaning 
to the broad language of the constitutions they are charged with 
interpreting. 
Initially, the Court drew a bright line between federal and state 
protections when it declared in 1833 that the Bill of Rights applied 
only to the federal government.  This clear line disappeared as the 
Court limited state criminal processes by selectively incorporating 
most of the protections in the Bill of Rights under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  When the Court in 1949 first 
applied the Fourth Amendment to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, it 
also refused to impose on state criminal processes the exclusionary 
rule, a federal protection established in the 1914 decision of Weeks v. 
United States, which barred federal officials from using illegally seized 
evidence to prove a suspect’s guilt.333  The Wolf Court relied on the 
practices of the majority of states, looking at state laws both before 
and after the Weeks decision.334  The Court stated, “As of today 31 
States reject the Weeks doctrine, 16 States are in agreement with it.”335  
The Wolf Court also trusted that states had adequate processes to 
check police abuse. 
 
 333 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), overruled by Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). 
 334 Id. at 29. 
 335 See id. 
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The Court changed its view of state search and seizure practices 
in 1961 when it overruled Wolf in Mapp v. Ohio, thus making the 
exclusionary rule applicable to the states.336  In its reversal, the Mapp 
Court declared that the state practices relied on in Wolf were “not 
basically relevant to” its decision whether the exclusionary rule 
applied.337  It viewed the practices cited by the Wolf Court as providing 
an historical, factual grounding.338  The Mapp Court then declared 
that recent state practices (i.e., those since the Wolf decision) 
provided a better perspective.339  It noted that “more than one-half” of 
states had “wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule [of 
exclusion].”340  Yet, both the majority and the dissent in Mapp 
recognized that state practices were not “controlling”341  and “beside 
the point.”342  Instead, the Mapp majority looked to the inadequacies 
of state remedies.343  In this state-remedy context, the Court canvassed 
the states, noting that “[l]ess than half of the States have any criminal 
provisions relating directly to unreasonable searches and seizures.”344  
Mapp thus ended the “asymmetry which Wolf imported into the 
law.”345  The Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule now 
applied to both federal and state officials. 
The Mapp Court viewed this harmony between federal and state 
courts as an example of the “healthy federalism”346 described in Elkins 
v. United States, decided one year before Mapp.  Elkins had banned 
federal officials from using evidence seized by state officials in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.347  By not allowing federal 
officials to receive this evidence on a “silver platter” from state 
officials (to whom the exclusionary rule did not apply), the Elkins 
Court proclaimed its ban to be wise federalism.  Despite this ban, the 
Court drew a sharp line when it declared that the federal court “must 
make an independent inquiry, whether or not there has been such an 
inquiry by a state court.”348  More directly, the Court stated, “[t]he test 
is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one state court may 
 
 336 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 337 Id. at 650. 
 338 Id. at 651. 
 339 Id. at 653. 
 340 Id. at 651. 
 341 Id. at 653. 
 342 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 343 Id. at 652. 
 344 Id. at 651-53 & 652 n.7. 
 345 Id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 346 Id. at 657 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960)). 
 347 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 213. 
 348 Id. at 224. 
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have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have 
colorably suppressed.”349 
For the dissent, the bright line in Elkins—a federal court’s 
authority to determine whether state officials violated federal law—
did not, however, signify trust in state officials.350  The dissent also 
forecasted future disharmony when states grant greater protection 
than that provided by the Fourth Amendment.351  The dissent noted 
that a difficult question remained unanswered: whether federal 
officials could use state-seized evidence obtained in compliance with 
the Fourth Amendment but in violation of state laws that provided 
greater search and seizure protection.352 
With many states granting greater protection under their state 
constitutions,353 the Court again sought to draw an important line in 
 
 349 Id. 
 350 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 241 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 351 Id. at 245-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 352 Id. at 245-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 353 Many states have granted their citizens greater search and seizure protection 
under their state constitutions than that provided by the Fourth Amendment.  
ALASKA: see, e.g., State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324-25 (Alaska 1985) (determining that 
state constitution, ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ 14 & 22, requires close scrutiny of 
warrants based on hearsay, and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s totality of 
circumstances doctrine articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983)).  
ARKANSAS: see, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Ark. 2002) (determining that 
state constitution, ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15, prohibits pretextual arrests, and rejecting 
U.S. Supreme Court’s foreclosure in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996), of inquires into police officers’ subjective motivations when they have 
probable cause).  CALIFORNIA: see, e.g., People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62, 71 (Cal. 
1984) (determining that, under state constitution, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13, person 
had “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the unlisted information which the 
telephone company disclosed to the police,” and impliedly rejecting U.S. Supreme 
Court’s determination of no expectation of privacy for telephone records in Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979)).  COLORADO: see, e.g., Tattered Cover, Inc. v. 
City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1059 (Colo. 2002) (determining that state 
constitution, COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7, requires law enforcement to have compelling 
need for bookstore customer’s purchase records before obtaining a warrant, and 
rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 
565-66 (1965), that First Amendment places no special limitation on ability of 
government to seize expressive materials under the Fourth Amendment); People v. 
Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 (Colo. 1999) (determining that state constitution, COLO. 
CONST. art. II, § 7, safeguards individuals’ “reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
personal telephone toll records and banking transaction records held by third-party 
banking and telephone service companies,” and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s 
determination of no expectation of privacy in phone records in Smith, 442 U.S. at 
745-46, and no expectation of privacy for bank records in United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).  CONNECTICUT: see, e.g., State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 
1309-10 (Conn. 1992) (stating that state constitution, CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 7 & 9, 
protects against unlawful attempts to take a presumptively innocent person into 
custody, and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in California v. Hodari D., 499 
U.S. 621, 626-27 (1991), that seizure requires either physical force or submission to 
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the assertion of authority).  DELAWARE: see, e.g., Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 864, 868-
69 (Del. 1999) (determining that, under state constitution, DEL. CONST. art. I, § 6, 
officer had seized suspect who refused to comply with his orders to stop and remove 
his hands from his pockets, and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Hodari D., 
499 U.S. at 626-27, that seizure requires either physical force or submission to the 
assertion of authority).  HAWAII: see, e.g., State v. Cuntapay, 85 P.3d 634, 641 (Haw. 
2004) (stating that state constitution, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7, guarantees short-term 
social guests a protected expectation of privacy and that state’s plain view doctrine 
requires inadvertent discovery of evidence, rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s more 
limited expectation of privacy for home visitors as decided in Minnesota v. Carter, 
525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998), and the Court’s elimination of the inadvertent discovery 
requirement from the plain view exception in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 
138-41 (1990)); State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 901 (Haw. 1995) (determining that 
state constitution, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7, requires citizens to have actual authority 
over premises to legally provide consent to searches, and rejecting doctrine of 
apparent authority as articulated in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184 (1990)).  
IDAHO: see, e.g., State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671-72 (Idaho 1992) (determining 
that state constitution, IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17, does not have good faith exception 
to exclusionary rule, and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s creation of this exception 
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)).  INDIANA: see, e.g., State v. 
Stamper, 788 N.E.2d 862, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (determining that individual had 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed at curb, 
IND. CONST. art. I, § 11, and impliedly rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s determination 
in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988), of no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in curbside trash); State v. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960, 971 (Ind. 2002) 
(impliedly interpreting state constitution, IND. CONST. art. I, § 11, to require closer 
scrutiny by courts of government decisions to establish sobriety checkpoints as well as 
manner of conducting them, and not adopting U.S. Supreme Court’s deference in 
evaluating sobriety checkpoints as expressed in Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990)).  LOUISIANA: see, e.g., State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 713 
(La. 1993) (stating that, under state constitution, LA. CONST. art. I, § 5, seizure may 
occur when officers create a situation suggesting an “imminent actual stop,” one that 
is “virtually certain to result from the police encounter,” and rejecting U.S. Supreme 
Court’s determination in Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-27, that seizure requires either 
physical force or submission to the assertion of authority) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  MASSACHUSETTS: see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balicki, 762 N.E.2d 290, 297-98 
(Mass. 2002) (stating that under state constitution, MASS. CONST. art. XIV, plain view 
doctrine requires inadvertent discovery, and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s 
elimination of the inadvertence requirement in Horton, 496 U.S. at 138-41).  
MICHIGAN: see, e.g., Sitz v. Dep’t of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Mich. 1993) 
(determining on remand from the United States Supreme Court that state 
constitution, MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11, forbids sobriety checkpoints because they are 
warrantless and suspicionless searches and seizures, and rejecting the Court’s 
deferential approach to sobriety checkpoints in Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455).  MINNESOTA: 
see, e.g., In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 578 (Minn. 2003) (concluding that 
“short-term social guests” have legitimate expectation of privacy under state 
constitution, MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10, even if U.S. Supreme Court did not later 
interpret Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998), to provide one); Ascher v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1997) (striking down sobriety 
checkpoints under state constitution, MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10, because officers lack 
“objective individualized articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before” 
stopping a driver, and rejecting the Court’s upholding of suspicionless sobriety 
checkpoints in Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455).  MONTANA: see, e.g., State v. Clayton, 45 P.3d 30, 
34 (Mont. 2004) (determining that under state constitution, MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 
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10 & 11, seizure standard is whether “a reasonable person would have felt that he was 
not free to leave,” and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
at 626-27, that seizure requires either physical force or submission to the assertion of 
authority); State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 302 (Mont. 2003) (determining that state 
constitution, MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 10 & 11, requires “particularized suspicion as a 
prerequisite for the use of a drug-detecting canine,” and rejecting U.S. Supreme 
Court’s statement in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000), that 
such use did not constitute a search); State v. Hamilton, 67 P.3d 871, 876 (Mont. 
2003) (determining that, under state constitution, MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 10 & 11, 
person who lost wallet retained constitutionally protected expectation of privacy that 
prevented police from searching the wallet any more than was necessary to 
determine the rightful owner, and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrine that 
state’s interest in  inventory searches outweighed defendant’s privacy interest as 
articulated in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645-47 (1983)); State v. Bauer, 36 
P.3d 892, 897 (Mont. 2001) (determining that police officer violated state 
constitution, MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 10 & 11, by arresting person “for a non-jailable 
offense when there [were] no circumstances to justify an immediate arrest,” and 
rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s condoning of warrantless arrest for minor criminal 
offenses, such as misdemeanor seatbelt violation, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 
U.S. 318, 354 (2001)).  NEVADA: see, e.g., Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 374 (Nev. 
2003) (determining that state constitution, NEV. CONST. art. I, § 18, requires “both 
probable cause and exigent circumstances for police to conduct a warrantless search 
of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest,” and rejecting U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981), allowing search of 
automobile passenger compartment after arrest of the driver); State v. Bayard, 71 
P.3d 498, 502 (Nev. 2003) (stating that under state constitution, NEV. CONST. art. I, § 
18, “absent special circumstances requiring immediate arrest, individuals should not 
be made to endure the humiliation of arrest and detention when a citation will satisfy 
the state’s interest,” and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s condoning of warrantless 
arrest for minor criminal offenses in Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354).  NEW HAMPSHIRE: see, 
e.g., State v. Goss, 834 A.2d 316, 319 (N.H. 2003) (determining that individual had 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed at curb, 
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19, and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s determination in 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41, of no reasonable expectation of privacy in discarded 
trash); State v. Sterndale, 656 A.2d 409, 411-412 (N.H. 1995) (determining that 
under state constitution, N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19, citizens did not have reduced 
expectations of privacy in automobiles, and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s 
automobile exception to warrant requirement, advanced in United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798, 809 (1982)).  NEW JERSEY: see, e.g., State v. Bruns, 796 A.2d 226, 232 (N.J. 
2002) (determining that state constitution, N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7, entitles criminal 
defendants to challenge searches and seizures made incident to traffic stops as 
unconstitutional when they demonstrate a “proprietary, possessory or participatory 
interest in either the place searched or the property seized,” and rejecting U.S. 
Supreme Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy standard articulated in Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)); State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 912 (N.J. 2002) 
(holding that under state constitution, N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7, consent searches 
following lawful motor vehicle stops are invalid unless there was “reasonable and 
articulable suspicion to believe that an errant motorist or passenger has engaged in, 
or [was] about to engage in, criminal activity,” and impliedly rejecting U.S. Supreme 
Court’s exclusive focus in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996), on whether valid 
consent had occurred); State v. McAllister, 840 A.2d 967, 975 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2004) (stating that under state constitution, N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7, individual 
had constitutionally protected reasonable privacy interest in bank records, and 
rejecting doctrine articulated in Miller, 425 U.S. at 443, that bank customers do not 
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have a reasonable expectation of privacy in banking records).  NEW MEXICO: see, e.g., 
State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 11-12 (N.M. 1997) (determining that state constitution, 
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10, requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances 
before conducting a warrantless automobile search, and rejecting doctrine of Ross, 
456 U.S. at 809, that probable cause alone justifies automobile searches).  NEW YORK: 
see, e.g., People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1336-38 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that state 
constitution, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12,  recognizes reasonable expectation of privacy 
when “landowners fence or post ‘No Trespassing’ signs on their private property or, 
by some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted,” even in 
land outside the curtilage, and rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination, 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984), that land outside curtilage does not 
benefit from occupant’s privacy interests).  NORTH CAROLINA: see, e.g., State v. 
McHone, 580 S.E.2d 80, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (determining that state 
constitution, N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20, does not permit good faith exception to 
exclusionary rule, and rejecting good faith exception doctrine of Leon, 468 U.S. at 
909).  OHIO: see, e.g., State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175, 178-79 (Ohio 2003) 
(determining that state constitution, OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14, prohibits warrantless 
arrests for minor misdemeanors unless one of a few stated exceptions applies, and 
rejecting the Court’s condoning of warrantless arrests for minor criminal offenses in 
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354).  OREGON: see, e.g., State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015, 1022 (Or. 
1988) (determining that state constitution, OR. CONST. art. I, § 9, guarantees citizens 
the right to be free from intrusive forms of government scrutiny, including while in 
the area outside an individual’s curtilage, and rejecting the holding of Oliver, 466 
U.S. at 178, that land outside the curtilage does not benefit from occupant’s privacy 
interests).  PENNSYLVANIA: see, e.g., Theodore v. Delaware Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 
76, 96 (Pa. 2003) (stating that state constitution, PA. CONST. art. I, § 8, affords 
students heightened sense of privacy that requires courts to closely examine school’s 
need to drug test students who participate in extracurricular activities or who drive to 
school, and rejecting U.S. Supreme Court’s finding in Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002), that random, 
suspicionless drug testing did not constitute unreasonable search and seizure); 
Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 776 (Pa. 1996) (determining that state 
constitution, PA. CONST. art. I, § 8, protects against attempts to take presumptively 
innocent persons into custody, and rejecting requirement of Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 
626-27, of compliance with an officer’s show of authority).  TENNESSEE: see, e.g., State 
v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989) (stating that state constitution, TENN. 
CONST. art. I, § 7, requires warrants to meet the more heightened standard “voiced in 
Aguilar and Spinelli,” a standard the U.S. Supreme Court replaced with the more 
relaxed totality of the circumstances approach in Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31).  UTAH: 
see, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991) (determining that state 
constitution, UTAH CONST. art. I, § 14,  protects person’s “right to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” of his or her bank records, and rejecting 
doctrine of Miller, 425 U.S. at 443, that bank customers do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in banking transaction records).  VERMONT: see, e.g., State v. 
Sprague, 824 A.2d 539, 541, 544-45 (Vt. 2003) (determining that under state 
constitution, VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 11, a “police officer must have a reasonable basis 
to believe that the officer’s safety, or the safety of others, is at risk or that a crime has 
been committed before ordering a driver out of a stopped vehicle” during a “routine 
traffic stop,” and rejecting the balancing test (between the public interest and the 
individual’s right to be free from arbitrary police interference), articulated in 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)).  WASHINGTON: see, e.g., State v. 
Rankin, 92 P.3d 202, 206 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (determining that, under state 
constitution, WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7, officer’s “mere request for identification from 
a passenger for investigatory purposes constitutes a seizure unless there is a 
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Michigan v. Long, which addressed both federal and state search and 
seizure protections.  For the Long Court, federalism allowed review of 
state-court judgments that did not contain a “plain statement” that 
judgment rested on state law rather than on federal law.354  To ban 
review by the Supreme Court, state courts had to clearly specify that 
their decisions rested on independent and adequate state grounds.355  
If ambiguity existed, the Supreme Court presumed review.356  For the 
Long Court, federalism required a uniform view of federal law.357  By 
contrast, the dissent interpreted the Long rule as ignoring the 
sovereignty of the states.358  Ultimately, the Long rule, coupled with 
the Burger Court’s narrowing of Fourth Amendment protections, 
gave state courts a clear means for shielding their decisions from 
review, namely, using the required plain statement. 
Despite safeguarding its interpretive turf in construing and 
applying both the Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule, the 
Court has, at times, invoked modern state search and seizure 
practices in evaluating Fourth Amendment issues beyond the 
question of incorporation.  When the Court canvassed state practices 
during the incorporation debate, it did so in light of the standards it 
created, examining the meaning of “liberty” and later considering 
what was “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”359  By 
contrast, when the Court has cited modern state police practices, it 
has selectively used them to project meaning onto the Fourth 
Amendment.360 Even though no coherent theory can explain when 
the Court will invoke current state practices to define the contours of 
the Fourth Amendment, an examination of those cases in which the 
Court has invoked modern state practices reveals both its selective 
deference to current practices and an implicit need for guidance in 
assessing and promulgating sound policing practices. 
 
reasonable basis for the inquiry,” and rejecting the Court’s doctrine that no seizure 
occurs when officers request, as opposed to demand, answers to questions, 
articulated in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980)).  WEST 
VIRGINIA: see, e.g., State v. Perry, 324 S.E.2d 354, 357-59 (W.Va. 1984) (determining 
that in some circumstances state constitution, W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6, requires 
officers to give arrested motorists opportunity to make “an alternative disposition” of 
their vehicles to avoid searches of their contents during impoundment, and rejecting 
possible limitations arising from U.S. Supreme Court’s inventory-search doctrine, 
established in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1976)). 
 354 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983). 
 355 Id. 
 356 Id. 
 357 Id. at 1040. 
 358 Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 359 See supra Part I.A. 
 360 See supra Part III. 
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Sometimes the Court has sought to support its Fourth 
Amendment interpretation by citing the practices of a majority of 
states and sometimes the Court has pointed to a purported “trend” in 
state practices.361  By contrast, the Court has also looked to the 
practice of a minority of states to create a new investigatory power for 
states.362  In short, the Court’s citation of modern state statutes 
suggests a rhetorical deference to state search and seizure practices. 
Several of these decisions have established important search and 
seizure rules.  In United States v. Watson, the Court upheld the power 
to arrest without a warrant when a felony has occurred in an officer’s 
presence, even in the absence of exigent circumstances.363  The Court 
used current state practices, which were consistent with the common-
law rule, to undercut its decisions that had expressed a strong 
preference for warrants.364  And Justice Powell cited the wisdom of 
“law enforcement agencies” to support the arrest rule.365  Similarly, 
the Court in Payton v. New York used “contemporary norms and 
conditions” to undermine a common-law rule, as it decided that an 
officer needed an arrest warrant to enter a suspect’s home.366  At one 
point, the Court described an evolving standard for the Fourth 
Amendment: it rejected the idea that the common law had “simply 
frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement practices that 
existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s passage.”367 
By contrast, the Court in Tennessee v. Garner construed state law 
and municipal practices as rejecting a common-law rule.368  By 
limiting police officers’ authority to use deadly force, the Court 
explained that many states and cities had indicated that such limits 
did not interfere with their interest in effective law enforcement.369  In 
short, while limiting authority, the Court rhetorically constructed a 
“trend” that appeared harmonious with states’ and cities’ self-
imposed restrictions. 
Other recent Fourth Amendment decisions also reveal the 
Court’s continued interest in state practices.  In Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, the Court listed statutes from all states, using these state 
practices to uphold an officer’s discretionary authority to arrest for 
 
 361 See supra Part III.A & Part III.C. 
 362 See supra Part III.B. 
 363 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976). 
 364 Id. at 419. 
 365 Id. at 430 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 366 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980). 
 367 Id. 
 368 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985). 
 369 Id. at 19. 
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fine-only traffic offenses.370  To justify its determination, the Court 
showed tremendous deference to state legislatures, suggesting that it 
was not interested in seriously questioning a state’s authority to 
decide the circumstances in which officers may arrest individuals for 
committing offenses subject to a fine-only penalty.  For example, the 
Atwater Court explained that the Washington Metro Transit Authority 
had permitted a District of Columbia police officer to arrest a person 
for “eating french fries” in a subway station, but noted that the 
Authority had changed its policy to provide for citations.371 In 2004, 
after Atwater, the Authority arrested a person “for chewing the last 
bite of her candy bar after she walked through the fare gates.”372  Even 
though the arresting officer was exercising federal authority, the 
Atwater decision nonetheless broadly supported a legislative body’s 
decision to grant arrest authority. 
The Court in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court similarly 
expanded state police power, but this time by citing the practices of a 
minority of states.  The Court upheld a state’s authority to compel a 
suspect to disclose his name during an investigatory stop.373  The 
Court noted that the state had the power to convict for obstruction of 
an officer’s duty when a suspect refused to disclose his name.  To 
sustain this power, the Court characterized the legal duty to disclose 
as arising from two state statutes: one statute required suspects to tell 
officers their names during investigatory stops,374 and the other 
provided criminal penalties for obstruction.375  The Court listed state 
statutes that contained specific name disclosure references, whether 
during investigatory stops or as an element of the criminal offense of 
loitering.376  The Court never mentioned the plethora of state 
obstruction statutes—a new possible source for this duty to disclose 
one’s name—nor the frequency of their discretionary use (as with the 
arrest and obstruction charge of eighty-six year old television reporter 
Mike Wallace for his driver’s parking violation377). 
These Fourth Amendment cases reveal the Court’s selective 
invocation of current state laws, whether used to expand or limit state 
 
 370 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
 371 Id. at 353 n.23. 
 372 Lyndsey Layton, Mouthful Gets Metro Passenger Handcuffs and Jail, WASH. POST, 
July 29, 2004, at A1. 
 373 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 (2004). 
 374 Id. at 2455-56. 
 375 Id. at 2456. 
 376 Id. 
 377 See Joshua Robin, City Probe on Wallace Cuffing, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 27, 2004, 
at A10; Associated Press, NYC Mayor to Probe Arrest of Mike Wallace (Aug. 11, 2004). 
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power.  Only rarely has the Court explained their relevance.  In 
Garner, the Court stated that canvassing modern practices helped it to 
assess the gravity of law enforcement interests—to strike the best 
balance of interests under the Fourth Amendment for determining 
when officers may reasonably use deadly force.  And, in Atwater, the 
Court used current state statutes to show states’ adherence to a broad 
common-law arrest power.  The Atwater Court also impliedly used 
these modern statutes to indicate the wisdom of state officials, who 
had only rarely used their arrest powers for petty offenses. 
The Court’s interest in current state policing practices and its 
turf-protecting Long decision in part resemble the struggle of state 
courts interpreting their own states’ constitutions.  Some state courts 
have looked outside their states to give meaning to their own 
constitutions, a process known as “horizontal federalism.”  As with the 
Supreme Court, these state courts have final authority to interpret 
their constitutions.  These state courts understand and hold fast to 
their sovereignty, recognizing that even if the language of their 
constitutions mirrors the language of the United States Constitution, 
they remain free to create new interpretations.  Other state courts, 
still maintaining their sovereignty, have declared that their 
constitutions provide no greater protection than that provided by the 
federal Constitution.  These state courts have adopted a “lockstep” 
interpretive approach.  In short, independent sovereign courts, both 
federal and state, have looked outside their constitutions for 
interpretive guidance. 
The difficulty of constitutional interpretation—how to give 
meaning to a text not designed to be a code of regulations—may in 
part explain the Supreme Court’s interest in current state laws.  The 
Court, however, has selectively invoked these modern laws, at times 
trusting the wisdom of state legislatures and sometimes mistrusting 
them.  In the end, the Court’s vacillating trust and mistrust of state 
legislatures and courts suggests an evolving standard of 
reasonableness for Fourth Amendment issues, one reflecting a 
peculiar kind of “Fourth Amendment federalism.” 
 
